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An Effective Regime for Non-
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Considerations for EU Reform 
Abstract 
For 85 years, the US regime for non-viable banks has maintained 
a high degree of stability and public confidence by protecting 
deposits, while working to minimise the public cost of that 
protection.  
With awareness of the difference in context, EU reformers can 
draw valuable insights from the US experience. On balance, a 
review of the US regime supports arguments in favour of 
harmonisation and centralisation of bank insolvency 
proceedings and deposit insurance in Europe’s banking union.  
A unitary regime would improve on the current EU status quo 
along multiple dimensions: deposit protection, creditor rights, 
controlling moral hazard, predictability and operational 
effectiveness, transparency and accountability, and financial 
stability. It would help break the bank-sovereign vicious circle in 
the euro area. The US experience suggests that substantial 
improvements are achievable in a well-designed system of 
institutional checks and balances that learns and adapts over 
time.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
• AML: Anti-Money Laundering 
• ATM: Automated Teller Machine 
• AVR: Asset Valuation Review (US) 
• BHC: Bank Holding Company (US) 
• BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
• BDB: Bundesverband deutscher Banken / association of German private banks (EU) 
• BRRD: Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of 2014 (EU) 
• CAL: Compulsory Administrative Liquidation (EU) 
• CFPB: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (US) 
• COM: abbreviation used in references or European Commission communications (EU) 
• CRD: Capital Requirements Directive (EU) 
• DFA: Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (US) 
• DGS: Deposit Guarantee Scheme (EU) 
• DGSD: Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (EU) 
• DIF: Deposit Insurance Fund (US) 
• ECA: European Court of Auditors (EU) 
• ECB: European Central Bank (EU) 
• EEA: European Economic Area (EU) 
• ESM: European Stability Mechanism (EU) 
• FDIA: Federal Deposit Insurance Act (US) 
• FBO: Foreign Banking Organization (US) 
• FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (US) 
• FDICIA: FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (US) 
• FFIEC: Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (US) 
• FHC: Financial Holding Company (US) 
• FOLTF: Failing Or Likely To Fail (EU) 
• FSB: Financial Stability Board 
• GAO: Government Accountability Office (US) 
• IDI: Insured Depository Institution (US) 
• IGA: Inter-Governmental Agreement (EU) 
• IMF: International Monetary Fund 
• IPS: Institutional Protection Scheme (EU) 
• MREL: Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities (EU) 
• NBIP: National Bank Insolvency Proceeding (EU) 
• NCUA: National Credit Union Administration (US) 
• OBA: Open Bank Assistance (US) 
• OCC: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (US) 
• OLA: Orderly Liquidation Authority (US) 
• OLF: Orderly Liquidation Fund (US) 
• P&A: Purchase and Assumption (US) 
• PIA: Public Interest Assessment (EU) 
• QFC: Qualified Financial Contract (US) 
• SPOE: Single Point of Entry 
• SRB: Single Resolution Board (EU) 
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• SRE: Systemic Risk Exception (US) 
• SRF: Single Resolution Fund (EU) 
• SRM: Single Resolution Mechanism (EU) 
• SRMR: Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (EU) 
• SSM: Single Supervisory Mechanism (EU) 
• TLAC: Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity 
• TLGP: Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (US) 
• TARP: Troubled Asset Recovery Program (US) 
• TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU) 
• USC: United States Code (US) 
• VDR: Virtual Data Room 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
• The US regime for non-viable banks is centralised in one institution, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC’s focus on deposit protection and its responsibility for the Deposit 
Insurance Fund have shaped its approach to bank supervision and handling non-viable banks.  
• The FDIC has transformed since its establishment in 1934 to reflect the growing complexity of the 
US financial system, as well as shifting political expectations and demands for public accountability. 
In a succession of learning experiences, which included high-profile failures, the US regime has 
developed an elaborate system of checks and balances to help minimise public costs and moral 
hazard, while maintaining predictability and credibility for deposit protection.  
o Among the regime’s achievements, smaller non-viable banks are routinely closed by the 
FDIC, without any public protection of creditors (let alone shareholders) and without 
disrupting the US financial system. The FDIC won praise for its smooth handling of many 
small bank failures and several larger ones in the crisis of 2007-2009. No one has lost money 
on insured deposits since the FDIC’s establishment. Uninsured depositors of failed banks 
have periodically incurred losses, though more often in non-crisis times than during 
systemic turmoil.  
o The regime’s effectiveness has been called into question repeatedly when it comes to 
handling large non-viable banks and banking groups. The 2007-2009 crisis revealed 
particularly troublesome gaps in dealing with large failing non-banks, with knock-on effect 
on the banking sector. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 affirmed corporate bankruptcy as the 
default framework for such firms, but gave the FDIC authority in exceptional circumstances 
to close them in process akin to the one it uses for banks. This feature of the US regime is 
still untested, as is its counterpart in the EU.  
• Given the depth and breadth of the US experience, EU policymakers would be remiss not to 
consider it as they design their own reforms. The current EU regime for non-viable banks was 
substantially shaped by legislation adopted in 2014 on bank recovery and resolution and, for the 
euro area, a “single resolution mechanism” anchored in a new EU agency, the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB). While this legislation signalled a central role for the new EU resolution regime, its 
application in practice has revealed gaps and distortions that make the EU resolution framework 
much less central than heralded:  
o National bank insolvency proceedings remain the default option for non-viable banks;  
o In combination with the current European Commission stance on state aid control, these 
national proceedings leave significant space for national governments to use public funds 
to compensate a wide range of claimants against failed banks;  
o Conversely, the EU resolution regime has hardwired requirements to impose losses on 
claims against failed banks, potentially including uninsured depositors;  
o As a result, the SRB has powerful disincentives against taking resolution action, and indeed 
has exhibited a greater reluctance to do so than had been generally anticipated;  
o Mutual support arrangements among groups of banks in member states offer additional 
opportunities to circumvent the strictures of the EU resolution framework. Such 
arrangements may benefit from a perception that they would be ultimately rescued by the 
national government if they became non-viable, like “too big to fail” banks.  
• Consequently, the EU regime for non-viable banks appears to be much less conducive to market 
discipline than its designers had advertised, and less so than the US regime, at least for all but the 
largest banks. The expectation of public financial intervention that persists in the current EU 
regime, moreover, perpetuates the bank-sovereign vicious circle that nearly broke up the euro area 
in 2011-2012.  
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• EU reformers should take a holistic view of the regime for non-viable banks, and consider how its 
constituent parts might evolve to create a system of checks and balances conducive to its effective 
operation. Recent EU experience seen in light of the longer US history militates against discrete 
tweaks to the EU resolution process that may leave intact the distortions and arbitrage.  
• The US experience provides powerful arguments in favour of a unitary regime with ultimate 
responsibility lodged in a single agency (presumably the SRB, relying on outposts in member 
states), with a mandate covering the entire regime, including deposit protection, resolution and 
liquidation/insolvency proceedings, with a residual role for the European Commission’s state aid 
control. A key consideration is regime predictability and the operational credibility of the agency 
in charge. To that end, centralisation would facilitate effective marketing of a non-viable bank’s 
franchise and assets on a cross-border basis, contributing to greater efficiency of the regime and to 
cross-border banking system integration at the same time. A correspondingly upgraded SRB 
should be equipped with the necessary tools to implement asset and liability transfers, burden-
sharing and liquidity support as necessary, with clear operational principles and accountability 
channels.  
• A regime for non-viable banks reformed along these lines would be helpful but not sufficient to 
break the bank-sovereign vicious circle. It would fit well within a broader policy package to 
complete the banking union. Such a package should also include limits on concentrated sovereign 
exposures, centralised tools to manage system-wide fragility, and an end to the intra-banking-
union ring-fencing of capital and liquidity for cross-border banks.1  
 
  
                                                             
1 The recently published conclusions of a high-level working group set up by the Eurogroup in December 2018, available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39768/190606-hlwg-chair-report.pdf, have echoes of this framing of the policy 
agenda to complete the banking union.  
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 INTRODUCTION AND SEMANTICS 
The European Union was poorly prepared for the severe financial crisis that started in the summer of 
2007 and climaxed in September-October 2008, before morphing into a joint crisis of euro area banking 
and sovereign finances in the ensuing years (e.g. Wolf, 2014; Bastasin, 2015; Bayoumi, 2017). As the 
crisis progressed, it exposed a particularly important vulnerability: the absence of an effective policy 
regime to deal with non-viable banks in most member states and at the EU level. The crisis prompted 
the EU to introduce elements of an ambitious new regime with EU legislation enacted in 2014: the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD, 2014/59/EU) and, for the euro area, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) Regulation (or SRMR, (EU) 806/2014), complemented by less foundational, though 
still important, legislative acts such as the third EU Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) Directive (or 
DGSD, 2014/49/EU).  
This new regime has barely been tested so far, with only few cases since its entry into force in 2015-
2016, and cannot be viewed as having reached a steady state. It is also more complex and path-
dependent than often perceived. The resolution regime of BRRD is explicitly designed as an exception 
to the default option, namely national bank insolvency proceedings (NBIPs). NBIPs are defined by 
national legislation, with barely any EU-level harmonisation so far – a key component of the political 
compromise that shaped the EU legislation of 2014. They are supported by national DGSs, which are 
only partly harmonised by the DGSD. The handling of non-viable banks is materially constrained by the 
pre-existing EU framework for state aid control, enforced by the European Commission through its 
Directorate-General for Competition. In several member states, mutual support arrangements among 
financial institutions play a critical role at the point of non-viability for some or all of the country’s banks. 
Such mutual support takes a range of binding or non-binding forms, including voluntary deposit 
guarantee schemes, institutional protection schemes, and other arrangements at the national or sub-
national level.  
It is natural to compare this complex and fledgling EU regime with its more established US 
counterpart.2 The US regime has been tried and tested more than any other in the world since its 
inception in 1933 with legislation that authorised the FDIC. Before the FDIC’s founding, the United 
States had a fragmented system that relied on multiple state-level and federal authorities to deal with 
bank failures. State-level experiments with bank note and deposit guarantees and mutual support 
arrangements first took hold in the 1830s, and returned to popularity several times in the 20th century, 
but ultimately failed en masse during banking panics. Since the establishment of the FDIC in 1934, the 
US regime has changed dramatically, accumulating operational experience, and adapting to many 
swings of the political pendulum. During the five years 2008-2013, the FDIC closed nearly 500 banks, 
including a handful of very large institutions, without destabilising the market (FDIC, 2017).  
Although the US regime has shown dynamism and resilience, it is not a model for the EU to replicate. 
The two jurisdictions have different legal, political, and banking structures and histories; they also came 
to design their respective regimes from very different starting points. The United States in the early 
1930s had a weak, fragmented public safety net for banks that failed on a large scale. In contrast, the 
EU in the 2000s boasted a constellation of robust, if implicit, member state guarantees. Such structural 
differences would make it impossible for the EU to use the US experience as a template to be copied; 
                                                             
2 Other jurisdiction-specific regimes for non-viable banks are either as fledgling and untested as the EU’s, and/or (as in Japan) 
less based on the principle of private-sector burden-sharing and thus not immediately comparable (see S&P Global Ratings, 
2019).  
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however, it can help inform institutional experimentation and occasionally serve as a cautionary tale to 
help avoid mistakes.  
Structure of the study and limitations of scope 
Section 2 of the study provides a summary overview and assessment of the US regime for non-viable 
banks. Section 3 similarly describes and assesses the EU regime as shaped by the legislative package of 
2014, and how it has played out in cases since mid-2015. Section 4 discusses possible objectives of 
further EU regime reform, and how corresponding policy options may be informed by observations 
from the US experience. Section 5 concludes.  
Institutional designs for dealing with non-viable banks are a matter of considerable complexity, 
combining many legal, financial and operational considerations. We inevitably had to make a number 
of choices to restrict the scope of the study.  
• First, the study is only about banks and banking groups, excluding other financial firms, notably 
credit unions (in the United States),3 non-bank “fintech” (financial technology) firms, investment 
services firms, insurers, and financial market infrastructures.  
• Second, the study starts at the point of acknowledged non-viability – or, in the EU parlance, when 
a bank is determined to be failing or likely to fail (FOLTF) – and does not examine tools that may be 
wielded at an earlier stage with “problem banks”. Such tools include emergency liquidity assistance 
and central banks’ lender-of-last-resort functions; supervisory actions such as prompt corrective 
action (US) and early intervention (EU); and crisis-related financial intervention such as temporary 
guarantee programs for banks, or the US Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2008 and its functional 
equivalent in the EU, known in BRRD as precautionary recapitalisation. Resolution planning is 
likewise beyond the scope of this study.  
• Third, while deposit insurance is included in the study’s scope to the extent it is part of the process 
of dealing with non-viable banks, it is not analysed in full. We focus on ex-post insurance payouts, 
and ways in which the protection of deposits and of deposit insurance funds interacts with the 
broader task of managing entire non-viable bank balance sheets. We avoid ex-ante design 
questions, such as options for insurance fee-setting (known in US practice as “assessments”) or for 
the specific design of a future European deposit insurance scheme.  
• Fourth, on the EU side the study is predominantly (though not exclusively) focused on the euro 
area. More generally, this study does not address issues of cross-border coordination in any depth, 
and emphasises domestic considerations from a US and euro-area perspective respectively. Thus, 
widely-discussed models for resolving cross-border banking groups, known as single-point-of-
entry and multiple-point-of-entry approaches, are for the most part beyond the scope of our 
analysis.4 We also leave aside any specific discussion of the United Kingdom.  
• Fifth, we stop short of designing or even sketching a blueprint for EU reform. Our focus is on 
identifying gaps in the existing framework and a menu of possible solutions, for use as part of a 
reform of the EU regime, which may itself be part of a broader effort to complete the European 
banking union.  
  
                                                             
3 US credit unions are in many way comparable to cooperative banks as exist in a number of European countries. But while 
the latter are included in the EU banking regulatory framework defined by the fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD4, 
2013/36/EU; with minor exceptions such as Irish credit unions – see CRD4 Article 2(5)), US credit unions retain a regulatory, 
supervisory and resolution framework separate from that for banks as briefly described in Section 2 below.  
4 We correspondingly do not assess the compatibility, or lack thereof, of the respective US and EU regimes to handle possible 
cases of non-viable banks with operations in both jurisdictions. We also give only limited attention to standards issued by 
global bodies on resolution, deposit insurance, and related concerns (FSB, 2011).  
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Semantics 
Semantics is a particular pitfall. The same words are used in different ways on the two sides of the 
Atlantic and occasionally also in different contexts inside the EU. This can easily lead to 
misunderstandings, or to misleading characterisations. This observation applies with special force to 
key terms, such as resolution, liquidation, and insolvency. We have tried, as much as practical, to define 
and use words that may be understood the same way by both European and US readers with an open 
mind. We made an exception, however, for “resolution”, because this word is currently used very 
differently in the United States and the EU (see below): we thus use it according to US practice in 
Section 2, and according to EU practice in Sections 3 and 4.  
The study refers repeatedly to “non-viable” banks, an adjective we use as shorthand for “failing or likely 
to fail” as defined by the BRRD. This phrase has no perfect US equivalent; it captures a range of bank 
conditions and actions that may be deemed so “unsafe and unsound” by regulators as to justify bank 
closure and the appointment of a receiver. Apart from making the study’s title and content more 
accessible to readers on either side on the Atlantic, our choice of “non-viable” also echoes Basel 
Committee language referring to the “point of non-viability” (BCBS, 2010).  
Terms such as resolution, liquidation and insolvency continue to cause confusion:  
• In the United States, “resolution” is an umbrella term that covers all modalities of dealing with a 
non-viable bank – whether through liquidation with depositor payoff (or “payout”, in EU parlance); 
purchase and assumption of the bank’s franchise by another bank and disposition of the residual 
assets and any liabilities under FDIC receivership; or “orderly liquidation” of large financial firms 
under new and still-untested modalities set by the Dodd Frank Act (DFA) of 2010.5 In the EU, 
“resolution” only refers to the process defined by BRRD, which may be viewed as the functional 
equivalent of US-style orderly liquidation authority,6 especially in the euro area, given differences 
in banking group structures7 and the restrictive early practice of public-interest assessment (see 
Section 3).8  
• In the United States, “insolvency” (like illiquidity) usually denotes a state, not a process: a bank is 
insolvent if its liabilities exceed its assets, or insolvent in the regulatory sense if it is deemed to be 
critically undercapitalised. The same use exists in the EU, but in addition, and specifically in the 
context of BRRD, “insolvency proceeding” refers to the process of closing a non-viable bank that 
does not go through EU resolution (Article 2(1)(47) BRRD). In the context of non-banks or 
individuals, what EU practice refers to as insolvency proceedings (often shorthanded “insolvency”) 
is generally called “bankruptcy” in the United States.9  
• In the United States, “liquidation” refers to asset disposition, often implicitly coupled with deposit 
payoff. Liquidation and payoff are often used interchangeably when describing an FDIC resolution 
method. “Orderly liquidation” is a new term introduced in the Dodd-Frank Act (see Section 2) and 
                                                             
5 Since orderly liquidation is governed by Title II of the DFA, it is sometimes referred to metonymically as “Title II authority”. 
Title II OLA authority serves as backup to the default option of federal bankruptcy for non-bank financial firms. Somewhat 
confusingly, Section 165(d) under Title I of DFA refers to “resolution planning”, even as it actually requires planning for 
bankruptcy. Such bankruptcy plans are sometimes (and in our view, imprecisely) referred to as “Title I resolution plans”.  
6 In the United States, “authority” often refers to a power granted by law to an agency, while in the EU that word is functionally 
equivalent to “agency” itself.  
7 In the EU, a large financial group’s holding company is typically also a licensed bank that may be subject to resolution, while 
US law stipulates that it be always a non-bank – see Section 2.  
8 At the global level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s use of “resolution” is similar to the EU practice, but in the EU context 
the FSB’s concept of resolution may also apply to certain national bank insolvency proceedings and not only to the EU 
resolution procedure defined by BRRD, as further explained in Section 3 (FSB, 2011).  
9 The word “bankruptcy” does not appear to be used in EU law. Colloquially in the EU, and depending on context, “bankruptcy” 
may be use as synonym either to liquidation or insolvency.  
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is functionally equivalent to resolution in the EU practice, as noted above. In the EU, liquidation is 
the asset disposition process that results from insolvency proceedings if no reorganisation is 
achieved. The European Commission and others also refer to “orderly liquidation” or simply 
“liquidation” for cases of (national) insolvency proceedings which are functionally equivalent to a 
resolution (in the FSB’s sense).10 
 
Other terms are used on one side of the Atlantic, but not the other. For example, “bail-in” is a legal 
concept in BRRD, and is often used in the EU more broadly to refer to any forced imposition of losses, 
also referred to as “burden-sharing”.11 US usage tends to avoid the term “bail-in”, except occasionally 
for practitioners working on cross-border matters. US participants might rather refer to “haircutting” 
creditors or uninsured depositors. Conversely, references to “open-bank” and “closed-bank” 
resolution—where the non-viable bank remains in operation and is rehabilitated, or ceases to exist—
are fairly common in the United States, but not so much in the EU.  
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 THE US REGIME AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Whereas the interplay between state and federal authority defines the US regulatory experience, in the 
area of bank resolution it has resulted in a highly centralised regime. That centralised approach, which 
covers banks of all sizes, stands in contrast to the historically fragmented US approach to bank 
chartering (broadly equivalent to licensing in the EU) and supervision. For all practical purposes, federal 
law and the federal safety net determine the process for handling non-viable banks and Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs, which stand at the top of banking groups as explained below), as well as securities 
firms.12 This section, like the entire study, focuses on banks – known as Insured Depository Institutions 
(IDIs) in US regulatory parlance – and BHCs. Regimes applicable to other firms are covered in a more 
limited fashion, with features relevant to the EU policy debate highlighted as appropriate, or not at all.  
As noted in the introduction, specialised US institutional arrangements for non-viable banks are quite 
elaborate and mature by comparison with their counterparts in other jurisdictions including the EU, 
and with arrangements for other kinds of financial institutions. BHCs, however, had no access to a 
specialised resolution regime—they would have to reorganise or liquidate in bankruptcy, a federal 
judicial proceeding, much like manufacturing or retail firms—until the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
introduced Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) for systemically important financial companies.13 OLA 
is meant to function as a backup option to bankruptcy, which remains the default process for non-
viable BHCs. At the time of writing, OLA is untested.  
Focusing on non-viable banks and BHCs helps flesh out long-running policy arguments that have 
shaped generations of institutional reforms, resulting in today’s elaborate bank resolution regime 
anchored in the FDIC and its Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). Arguments about political capture, moral 
hazard, and “taxpayer bailouts”—and countervailing concerns about systemic risk, access to banking 
services, and deposit protection—animate current debates in the EU and in the United States, albeit in 
very different institutional contexts.  
2.1 US institutional architecture basics 
The regulatory and supervisory architecture relevant to non-viable banks in the United States reflects 
its complex history of state and federal oversight, and more than two centuries of dynamic adaptation 
between the financial industry and its regulators (Gelpern & Véron 2018). This summary description is 
not comprehensive, and only intended as a primer for unfamiliar EU readers.  
The term “bank” in the United States does not consistently describe the same set of institutions it does 
in the EU. The term generally refers to state and federally-chartered banks whose deposits are insured 
by the FDIC, and to any state or federally-chartered institutions that accept demand deposits and make 
commercial loans.14 This definition importantly excludes credit unions (see Section 1), savings and loan 
associations (traditionally, housing lenders, also called thrifts), and US branches of foreign banks, even 
                                                             
12 Insurance firms, by contrast, continue to be chartered, regulated, supervised, resolved, and backstopped by individual 
states.  
13 Dodd-Frank Act, Sec. 203(b)(2). 
14 Under the US Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (12 USC §1841(c)(1), internal references omitted): “[T]he term 
“bank” means any of the following: (A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act […]. (B) 
An institution organised under the laws of the United States, any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any 
territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands which both— (i) accepts demand 
deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others; and 
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans.” The Federal Deposit Insurance Act separately defines “bank” by 
reference to charter form – in other words, a bank is that which is chartered as a bank under applicable state and federal laws; 
an “insured bank” under section 3(h) of the act is a bank whose deposits are insured by the FDIC (12 U.S.C. §1813(h)).  
An Effective Regime for Non-Viable Banks: US Experience and Considerations for EU Reform 
 
PE 624.432 13  
if they take FDIC-insured deposits.15 Parallel and distinct oversight, insurance, and resolution regimes 
have historically applied to credit unions and thrifts. Distinctions between bank and thrift regimes, 
however, have been gradually eliminated between the early 1990s (following the so-called savings and 
loan crisis during the 1980s) and 2010 (enactment of the DFA). As a consequence, we frequently use 
“banks” thereinafter as shorthand for “banks and/or thrifts”, and synonymous to IDIs. Credit unions, by 
contrast, continue to be supervised separately by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), 
which also administers the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund.16  
Unlike in the EU, in the United States a bank is a distinct legal form, which may be established either by 
state or by federal charter. The charter operates both as a constitutive document (functionally 
equivalent to an EU’s bank incorporation, if it has a corporate legal form) and a banking license. The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), an independent regulatory agency within the US 
Treasury Department, issues all federal bank charters. State regulatory agencies issue state bank 
charters under individual state laws. Federally-chartered banks must obtain FDIC insurance to take 
deposits, and must become members of the Federal Reserve System. State-chartered banks are not 
required to become Federal Reserve members, but must normally obtain FDIC insurance, which 
justifies their federal oversight. 
State bank charters predominated in the United States through the 19th century, save for the two early 
and limited US experiments with central banking, the First and Second Banks of the United States, 
which ended in 1836. National (i.e. federal) bank charters were introduced under the National Banking 
Acts of 1863 and 1864, primarily to help finance the Union in the US Civil War. This legislation also 
established the OCC and gave it chartering and supervisory authority. The system operated without a 
central bank until the Federal Reserve System was established in 1913. The new central bank initially 
had only limited and indirect regulatory authority. Until 1980, access to Federal Reserve liquidity was 
conditional on membership of the Federal Reserve System, which is optional for state-chartered 
banks.17 
Federally-chartered (“national”) banks hold the bulk of US bank assets. At the end of 2018, 866 federally-
chartered banks held $11.3 trillion in assets, compared to $2.9 trillion for 793 state-chartered Federal 
Reserve member banks, and $2.6 trillion for 3,140 state-chartered non-member banks.18  
Virtually all US IDIs are owned by BHCs (Avraham, Selvaggi & Veckery 2012),19 which are not themselves 
chartered banks but ordinary business corporations.20 The dominance of this holding-company form 
partly reflects the long legacy of strict limits on banks’ geographic expansion and non-bank activities 
                                                             
15 12 USC §1841(c)(2); the statute contains additional exclusions immaterial to this study.  
16 Credit unions are usually not referred to as IDIs, even though their deposits are insured (by the NCUA).  
17 The Federal Reserve could regulate by imposing conditions on membership; however, stringent conditions threatened to 
dissuade potential members from joining, while the benefits of access to Fed liquidity were uncertain in the early years. 
18 Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Annual Report 2018, available at 
https://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/annrpt18.pdf.  
19 When the IDI is a thrift, the holding company is known as a savings and loan holding company.  
20 In 2017 and 2018, three mid-size regional banks merged their holding companies into their IDI subsidiaries, shedding the 
BHC designation. The largest was federally-chartered Zions Bank, with $66 billion in assets and 433 branches in western United 
States. The banks cited their desire for streamlined regulation as the main reason for the mergers. To date, these remain rare 
exceptions, and the costs and benefits of giving up the BHC status continue to be debated. See V. Gerard Comizio and Nathan 
S. Brownback, “Shedding the Status of Bank Holding Company,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and 
Financial Regulation, 11 August 2018, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/11/shedding-the-status-of-bank-
holding-company/; Thomas Homburg, “Bank Holding Companies – The Case for Not Firing the Federal Reserve,” American Bar 
Association Banking Law Committee Journal, 2 July 2019, available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/banking/2019/201904/fa_3/.  
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in the United States. Holding companies started as a way to circumvent these limits; the BHC Act of 
1956 was partly an effort to regain control over geographic and commercial expansion, and gave the 
Federal Reserve regulatory and supervisory authority over BHCs (Omarova & Tahyar 2011). To control 
a bank no matter how small, a company must get approval from the Federal Reserve, and submit to a 
host of activities and affiliation restrictions.21  
Each US IDI has a “primary federal regulator” responsible for its prudential regulation and continuous 
supervision. The following is a summary of primary federal prudential oversight responsibilities over 
banks:  
• The OCC charters, regulates, and supervises all national (federally-chartered) banks, which must be 
members of the Federal Reserve System.  
• Each of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks that comprise the Federal Reserve System supervises state-
chartered member banks within its geographic Federal Reserve District.  
• The Federal Reserve Board supervises BHCs on a consolidated basis, with authority typically 
delegated to the geographically relevant Federal Reserve Bank. The Federal Reserve Board 
approves applications for BHC status. Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) are a subset of BHCs that 
meet more stringent regulatory criteria to engage in an expanded range of financial activities.22 
The Federal Reserve Board is also responsible for approving foreign bank entry in the United States, 
and for supervising Foreign Banking Organisations (FBOs)23.  
• The FDIC supervises state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System; it 
also has “backup” supervisory authority over all IDIs as described below (subsection 2.2).  
 
In addition to prudential oversight at the federal level, consumer-facing aspects of banks’ business 
conduct fall within the purview of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent 
bureau within the Federal Reserve established under the DFA. The Federal Reserve, FDIC, NCUA, OCC, 
and CFPB coordinate oversight through a federal body called the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examinations Council (FFIEC). State bank regulators coordinate through the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors. Other aspects of business conduct, including Anti-Money Laundering (AML) oversight, fall 
under the authority of separate federal agencies.  
By comparison with the EU, the US banking system is characterised by the multiplicity of prudential 
oversight authorities: state and federal chartering authorities, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC all 
have prudential regulatory and supervisory mandates. Most large banks and all BHCs fall entirely under 
federal oversight; small banks tend to be state-chartered and thus supervised by both state and federal 
authorities.24 In contrast, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the only licensing authority for all banks in 
                                                             
21 This requirement does not apply to an individual or a government, neither of which is a “company” within the meaning of 
the BHC Act. 
22 Historically and with few exceptions, banks in the United States were not allowed to underwrite or sell insurance. The 
Banking Act of 1933 also barred banks from the securities business. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 permitted banks to 
affiliate with insurance and securities firms as part of an FHC.  
23 FBOs with US assets of more than $50 billion are required to form an intermediate holding company and to submit to 
enhanced prudential supervision by the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve Regulation YY, 12 CFR 252 (2012)). Foreign banks 
generally operate in the United States through subsidiaries, branches, and offices. Subsidiaries are US banks controlled by 
foreign owners. Branches are extensions of the foreign bank, and do not have separate capital in the United States. Since 1991, 
foreign banks in the United States must establish as subsidiaries—not branches—to take insured deposits from the public; a 
small number of “grandfathered” foreign branches remain. Also beginning in 1991, foreign banks must obtain Federal Reserve 
approval to establish in the United States, and must be supervised at the federal level.  
24 As of 2018, 79 percent of all banks in the United States were chartered and supervised by state authorities. Source; 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors Annual Report 2018, available at https://www.csbs.org/system/files/2019-
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the euro area, including “less significant institutions” with less than EUR 30bn in total assets. For the 
latter, some “day-to-day” supervisory responsibilities are assigned to national authorities, but not the 
key decisions about licensing or qualifying holdings (i.e. change of controlling ownership).  
Critically for this study, however, the United States has a much more centralised and thoroughly 
integrated framework for dealing with non-viable banks, with the FDIC exercising substantial practical 
control, and other authorities playing more limited parts. In the EU, as described in the next section, 
responsibility for non-viable banks is distributed among the SRB, national resolution authorities, other 
national judicial and/or administrative bodies that may be involved in NBIPs and DGSs, and the 
European Commission as the enforcer of state aid controls. Even for resolution action inside the euro 
area, the SRB is only one of many players – the European Commission and Council play roles in the 
decision on the resolution scheme, and then (per SRMR) the “execution” of the scheme is the 
responsibility of national resolution authorities, not the SRB.  
2.2 Historical Context 
The FDIC was established in 1934 after a wave of bank failures, and after decades of unsuccessful 
attempts to establish federal deposit insurance. Over the same period, ad hoc state and federal 
receiverships for non-viable banks were prone to political capture, and lacked resources and 
professionalism. The failure of smaller-scale state and mutual guarantee arrangements for banks 
created an opening for the FDIC, which combined insurance and resolution functions. The FDIC’s initial 
design gave it limited tools to execute its resolution objectives. 
                                                             
03/CSBS_AR2018_FINALproof.pdf. As noted earlier, most of these banks are also subject to FDIC and/or Federal Reserve 
oversight. 
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Figure 1: Summary of US banking history
 
Source: authors, based on Gelpern and Véron (2018) 
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Receivers were often private individuals; they were appointed ad hoc by the chartering authorities, 
which also functioned as the banks’ primary regulators, and reported to them. Receivers did not have 
independent budgets or borrowing authorities.  
Public and private mutual support arrangements, liability guarantee and liquidity backstop schemes 
varied among states (Calomiris & Haber 2014, pages 174-175; Weber, 2014; Golembe & Warburton, 
1958).25 Researchers have identified two general types of schemes prevailing in the United States 
between 1829 and the start of the Civil War: private, unlimited mutual liability arrangements where 
banks had the authority and incentives to screen members and monitor one another, and state-
sponsored insurance funds financed by bank assessments, with broad-based membership and limited 
screening and oversight. Most of the guarantee schemes became insolvent after banking panics in the 
late 1830s and again in the 1850s; a handful lapsed with the onset of federal bank charters. However, 
limited-membership, unlimited-liability private schemes did better at controlling bank risk-taking and 
losses to creditors (Calomiris 1990, Weber 2014).26  
                                                             
25 In the 19th century, the emphasis was on guaranteeing bank notes, which functioned as money in the absence of a national 
currency before the Civil War. 
26 Amid bank failures in 1931, President Herbert Hoover encouraged the creation of the National Credit Corporation, a private 
corporation meant to serve as an industry self-help vehicle for strong banks to lend to their weak brethren, without resort to 
public funds. The initiative failed in a matter of weeks, as the strong refused to lend or demanded high-quality collateral from 
the weak (FDIC 1984, page 36, Lamke & Upham 1934, pages 6-7). 
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The establishment of the national bank charter and of the OCC during the Civil War ushered in federally-
guaranteed uniform bank notes and more rigorous, professionalised bank supervision. However, it also 
launched intense competition for bank charters between states and the federal government, and led 
to the rise of deposit banking. National bank deposits, unlike bank notes, were not guaranteed. In the 
spirit of competition, state deposit guarantee schemes proliferated beginning in 1908. Most collapsed 
with a wave of regional bank failures in the 1920s; none were left after 1930 (Warburton, 1959).  
Both federal and state receivership practice had fallen into disrepute by then. Receiverships were 
notoriously corrupt and politicised in some areas, and overwhelmed in all. A 1934 Brookings Institution 
report is worth quoting at length for a sense of the context for the FDIC’s establishment:  
The appointment of receivers is the source of much difficulty, and has given rise to many allegations of 
political pressure and irregularity. Should the receiver be a local resident or would a stranger be more 
disinterested? […] Before the creation of a corps of specialists in liquidating closed banks, the office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency accepted Congressional suggestions as to receivership appointments, 
always with the understanding, of course, that a person with the necessary qualifications was proposed. 
This practice has been revived recently since the bank fatalities have been so numerous that the 
professional staff of the Comptroller cannot handle them all. It would be too much to hope that this 
system is free from abuse, and there has been much criticism in the press of appointments smacking of 
political favoritism. […] Bank supervisors in a number of states in recent years have been indicted for 
maladministration. Sometimes these indictments are for failure to close banks, sometimes for closing 
them without cause, and sometimes for the manner in which the assets are administered in receivership. 
An investigation and report made in 1930 by the Attorney-General of South Dakota charged neglect and 
loss as a result of the methods employed by the State Banking Department in managing the affairs of 
closed banks. Legislative investigations are now in progress in Pennsylvania and Ohio. […] Some 
students of the subject charge that the entire bank receivership system is wasteful and inefficient. They 
blame in part the fact that receiverships have been doled out as political "plums," the recipients of which 
attempt to make as much commission as possible, and to keep the job going as long as possible. It must 
be admitted that, except where liquidation is a regular function of an agency with established personnel, 
such charges have frequently been substantiated. […] Some states have not had a sufficient number of 
bank failures to justify the elaborate system of supervised liquidation which exists in the national system. 
(Lamke & Upham 1934) 
The passage highlights persistent challenges in pre-FDIC ad hoc receiverships that—while not directly 
applicable to the EU—may have relevance beyond the narrow historical context. Most important 
among these are vulnerability to political influence, lack of professionalism, and inadequate resources. 
Some but not all could be attributed to limited scale and lack of diversification.  
The history of state guarantee arrangements and ad hoc receiverships supplied arguments both for 
and against federal deposit insurance and centralised resolution authority. The FDIC’s establishment 
was controversial. The US Congress had rejected 150 bills to establish federal deposit insurance 
between 1886 and 1933 (FDIC 1984, Calomiris & Haber 2014). Semantics were weaponised, most 
notably the choice between calling the new scheme “insurance” and “guarantee.” Advocates of the 
new law stressed “the insurance principle” for its business-friendly risk-diversification association, and 
the distance it put between the FDIC and its undiversified state antecedents. Antagonists used 
“guarantee” to highlight government backing for small, presumably uncompetitive banks and the link 
to prior state scheme failures (Flood 1992). Giving due credit to the long history and fraught political 
economy of the legislative battles (e.g. Calomiris 1990), as a practical matter, the field had been largely 
cleared of competition both in the insurance and resolution spaces by 1933. By the time of its 
establishment, the FDIC was the only game in town.  
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The FDIC’s authorisation under the Banking Act of 1933 lists its resolution function before deposit 
insurance.27 The initial of the resolution mechanism is worth considering to appreciate the extent of its 
transformation. At the outset, the only way the FDIC could resolve failing institutions was to establish 
temporary Deposit Insurance National Banks (DINBs, discussed below) to pay off deposits. Authorities 
to pay off deposits directly, and to buy and sell assets did not come until 1935. The Banking Act of 1933 
also legislated insured depositor preference, which was repealed in 1935. Between 1935 and 1993, all 
depositors and the FDIC as subrogee were put on the same footing as general unsecured creditors in 
federally-chartered bank resolution. For state-chartered banks, distribution priority was governed by 
state law. Thirty states had enacted depositor preference before 1993 federal depositor preference 
legislation (see below); some had done so as early as 1909, but most in the 1980s (Marino & Bennett 
1999).  
2.3 What the FDIC does 
Over its 85-year history, the FDIC has developed a broad range of approaches for dealing with non-
viable banks. It uses a variety of transaction structures to transfer the assets and liabilities of non-viable 
banks back to private ownership and to limit the cost of receivership to taxpayers. Crises and waves of 
bank failures have periodically exposed gaps in the toolkit and led to administrative and legislative 
innovation. Although the FDIC became adept at resolving smaller banks in good times and even in 
crisis, it often had trouble closing and resolving large, complex institutions, which came to benefit from 
authorities originally granted to support smaller community banks. Over time, the FDIC established 
predictable routines and methodologies for dealing with non-viable banks, including asset valuation, 
confidential franchise marketing, and liquidity support. It also instituted accountability mechanisms in 
response to demands from US Congress.  
A non-viable bank fails28 when its chartering authority revokes its charter and appoints the FDIC as 
receiver. The bank’s assets and liabilities are transferred to a dedicated legal entity, known as the 
receivership. There is one receivership for each failed bank. The process typically begins up to 90 days 
beforehand (Figure 2.1), when the bank’s primary regulator, in coordination with the FDIC, notifies it 
that it is “critically undercapitalised or insolvent.” The time frame is embedded in federal legislation, 
which requires a bank’s primary federal regulator to appoint a receiver no later than 90 days after it 
becomes critically undercapitalised under FDIC regulations. Once bank management are notified, FDIC 
staff meet with them to begin due diligence and marketing of bank assets and liabilities, subject to 
strict confidentiality commitments on the part of all involved.29 After bank closure, the process of 
winding up the receivership may take years, although the FDIC typically sells most marketable assets 
within 90-120 days of closure.30 In other words, roughly half of the FDIC’s most intense resolution work 
                                                             
27 Banking Act of 1933, Section 8, inserted a new Section 12B in the Federal Reserve Act, which began as follows: “(a) There is 
hereby created a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'), whose duty it shall be 
to purchase, hold, and liquidate, as hereinafter provided, the assets of national banks which have been closed by action of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, or by vote of their directors, and the assets of State member banks which have been closed by 
action of the appropriate State authorities, or by vote of their directors; and to insure, as hereinafter provided, the deposits of 
all banks which are entitled to the benefits of insurance under this section.” Digitised by FRASER, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis, available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/466/item/15952.  
28 We use “failure” and “closure” interchangeably in this section. Historical sources also use “suspension” to mean the same 
thing. All three terms connote revocation of the banking charter. 
29 We are not aware of any cases of confidentiality breaches during this period.  
30 For instance, in 2018 the FDIC started no new receiverships, but continued to administer 272 active receiverships at the end 
of that year, most of which were created during the crisis years 2007-13. It had terminated 66 receiverships over the course of 
the year. According to its annual report, “For 95 percent of failed institutions, at least 90 percent of the book value of 
marketable assets is marketed for sale within 90 days of an institution’s failure for cash sales, and within 120 days for structured 
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is done confidentially before bank closure, with the other half done in public after the proverbial 
“resolution weekend.”31 By its end, the FDIC-administered receivership will have disposed of the bank’s 
assets and paid its remaining liabilities in the prescribed order of priority.  
Figure 2: FDIC Actions Taken before Bank Closure  
 
Source: FDIC Resolutions Handbook (2019). AVR stands for Asset Valuation Review. 
The FDIC’s Dual Role  
Outside resolution, the FDIC acts as insurer and backup prudential supervisor for insured banks. During 
the resolution process, the FDIC acts as insurer and, simultaneously, as receiver.  
• As insurer, the FDIC is responsible for paying off insured deposits from the DIF. Once deposits are 
paid off, the FDIC assumes their place in the claims distribution process, “stepping into their shoes”. 
Through this mechanism, known as “subrogation”, the FDIC typically becomes the largest and one 
of the most senior creditors of the receivership.  
                                                             
sales.” Source: FDIC Annual Report 2018, page 48, available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2018annualreport/2018ar-final.pdf.  
31 FDIC outreach and media treatment of resolution emphasise the fact that banks are usually closed on a Friday, so that 
depositors may access their funds on Monday, creating the impression that all resolution work is done in two days. The FDIC 
Resolutions Handbook, in contrast, describes the weekend as the start of the last step of the process: “The final step of the 
resolution process begins when the institution closes, and the assets and deposits are transferred to the [acquiring institution]. 
The chartering authority closes the institution and appoints the FDIC as receiver. This event usually occurs on a Friday at the 
end of the business day, which gives the FDIC time to work over the weekend.” FDIC Resolutions Handbook (2019), page 14, 
available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf.  
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• As receiver, the FDIC has broad powers to dispose of assets, assume or repudiate contracts, 
recognise (“allow”) and pay or reject claims. 
Some financial industry observers have expressed concern about inherent conflicts in such an 
arrangement (e.g., Douglas & Guynn 2009). Insurance and receivership functions were separate before 
the FDIC’s establishment and in several instances since; however, the dual role has become entrenched 
and continues unchallenged for all practical purposes. 
The FDIC as insurer is in charge of the DIF, which is funded in advance with supervisory risk-based 
assessments on IDIs. The FDIC’s financial resources include: its own operating budget; DIF borrowing 
authority of $100 billion from the US Treasury; and a note purchase agreement for $100 billion for the 
DIF with the Federal Financing Bank, a specialised government corporation under the US Treasury. The 
FDIC is subject to a statutory maximum cap on its obligations, which stood at $201.8 billion at the end 
of 2018.32  
The FDIC’s access to financing from the DIF gives it considerable flexibility as receiver. A standalone 
receiver would need to secure outside funding to manage and dispose of assets, much like a 
bankruptcy trustee – except that a receiver’s task is likely to be harder because bank failures tend to 
come in waves and are more likely to coincide with credit contractions. Access to the DIF and the 
attendant borrowing and lending authority relieve the funding pressure (Carnell et al. 2017, pages 410-
411), but fuel moral hazard concerns that periodically animate US banking legislation.  
The FDIC’s appointment as receiver is mandatory for all federally-chartered IDI.33 Appointment criteria 
are broad, and for the most part are functionally equivalent to BRRD criteria for declaring a bank FOLTF 
(summarised in Box 1). State chartering authorities may appoint the FDIC as receiver for state-chartered 
insured banks. Immediately after the FDIC’s establishment, state appointment practice varied; 
however, the FDIC has progressively taken over the receivership business in the second half of the 
20th century, and now acts as receiver for virtually all state- and federally-chartered banks and thrifts. 
The FDIC as receiver does not report to the chartering authorities that appointed it.34 As part of the US 
legislative response to the failure of 1,617 banks and 747 thrifts in the 1980s and 1990s, the FDIC 
secured authority to appoint itself receiver under certain conditions. The change reflected concern that 
chartering authorities lacked necessary independence to close a failed or failing institution quickly 
enough to minimise losses to the DIF.  
Although the FDIC prefers to have chartering authorities close insolvent banks and appoint it as 
receiver, it has the ability to terminate or suspend insurance coverage under the FDIA, so long as it 
gives advance notice to the bank’s primary regulator and to the bank itself, no less than 30 days before 
closure. Insurance termination forces the bank into receivership. Grounds for insurance termination are 
similar to the grounds for appointing a receiver, comprising unsafe and unsound activities, unsafe and 
                                                             
32 FDIC Annual Report (2018), available at https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2018annualreport/2018ar-final.pdf. 
The FDIC frequently states, that FDIC insurance is “backed by the full faith and credit of the US government”, and FDIC-insured 
banks are required by federal law to display the FDIC logo including that statement. The backing derives from the FDIC’s 
borrowing authority and the accompanying appropriation; from 1987 legislation expressing the “sense of the [US] Congress” 
to that effect; and from 1989 legislation requiring that insured banks display the logo containing “full faith and credit” 
language.  
33 In 1989, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act established that the FDIC is not appointed as 
receiver for uninsured institutions. The last receivership for an uninsured federal institution occurred during the Great 
Depression. In anticipation of issuing federal “fintech” charters, the OCC promulgated a new rule in 2017 implementing its 
authority to appoint a receiver for uninsured federally-chartered firms under the National Banking Act, which preceded the 
establishment of the FDIC. Reference: 12 CFR Part 51 (Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks).  
34 In contrast, before FDIC receivership, the receiver reported to the appointing authorities.  
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unsound conditions, and violations of the law including money laundering. Insurance termination is 
rarely used: it was introduced as a supervision and enforcement tool, but it quickly proved to be 
“inflexible and impractical” as such (Curry et al. 1999). It remains an important component of the US 
regime, however, as it gives the FDIC leverage in its interactions with the bank’s chartering authorities 
and other regulators that may be inclined to engage in regulatory forbearance.35  
The FDIC’s expansive authority to terminate insurance and appoint itself receiver has two important 
implications: it incentivises other regulators (including the bank chartering authorities) to cooperate, 
and puts the objective of minimising losses to the DIF at the heart of the resolution process. 
Box 1: Grounds for Appointment of a Receiver  
Any of the following conditions can give rise to the appointment of FDIC as receiver: 
• Regulatory insolvency (bank is under-capitalised under the prompt corrective action framework) 
• Balance sheet insolvency (liabilities exceed assets) 
• Inability to pay obligations or meet depositors’ demands in ordinary course (illiquidity) 
• Unsafe or unsound condition 
• Wilful violation of a cease-and-desist order 
• Concealment of books, papers, records, or assets 
• Violation of anti-money laundering laws and regulations 
 
This list is not exclusive. In general, grounds for appointment—like grounds for termination of insurance—
include a range of unsafe and unsound conditions, unsafe and unsound activities, and violations of the law, 
including statutes, regulations, regulatory settlements and enforcement orders.36 
2.4 FDIC Resolution Toolkit 
Except as noted otherwise, this subsection follows the descriptions and usage in the FDIC Resolutions 
Handbook (2019).37  
The FDIC uses variations on two resolution methods in dealing with non-viable banks: liquidation 
(often called payoff, or deposit payoff), and purchase and assumption (P&A). These methods can be 
used alone or in combination. In addition, the FDIC as receiver can form a bridge bank to facilitate 
resolution using one or more of these methods over time. 
Liquidation 
The FDIC as receiver may pay off uninsured depositors and other claimants from the proceeds of bank 
asset sales, or in advance, based on its asset recovery estimates. 
• In “straight deposit payoff”, the FDIC as insurer pays insured depositors. The FDIC as receiver 
gathers and sells bank assets, and remains responsible for paying all of its liabilities and the 
administrative costs of resolution. 
• “Insured deposit transfer” allows the FDIC to transfer insured deposits to a healthy bank, usually in 
the same community or region as the failed bank, to effect payoff. The healthy bank functions as 
the FDIC’s agent. 
• When the FDIC cannot effect deposit transfer quickly, it may form a Deposit Insurance National 
Bank (DINB) to maintain continuous access to insured funds for depositors, “particularly in 
                                                             
35 The Federal Reserve’s ability to deny banks access to emergency liquidity serves a similar function, as part of the broader 
system of checks and balances. 
36 12 USC §1821(c)(5). 
37 Some terms relevant to bank resolution are not used consistently in the literature and over time.  
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underserved areas.” A DINB is a temporary special-purpose bank that has no capital, specifically 
formed to pay off insured deposits. As mentioned earlier, DINB was the sole resolution method 
available to FDIC between 1933 and 1935. Recent DINBs have typically remained open for 30 days, 
although FDIC has the authority to operate them for up to two years. 
 
Purchase and Assumption  
P&A covers a wide range of transactions between the FDIC and acquiring institutions, typically other 
banks. The basic idea is to have a healthy institution assume some or all assets and liabilities of the 
failed bank, with or without financial support from the FDIC.  
P&A can be tailored to the characteristics of the institutions involved. The FDIC’s approaches to P&A 
have changed dramatically over time. For instance, limits on bank geographic expansion under state 
and federal banking laws constrained early use of P&A. The FDIC has had the authority to engage in 
P&A since 1935, but did not begin to emphasise the practice until the late 1960s. Between 1935 and 
1966, the FDIC avoided closure and receivership, preferring to find an acquirer for the non-viable bank’s 
good assets and liabilities while the bank was still open. It used its authority to buy and manage 
problem assets. When it could not find acquirers, it used payoff in other cases, most of which were in 
states with branching restrictions (FDIC 1984, page 82). Since 1966, the FDIC has used competitive 
bidding to select the acquiring institutions. 
• In a “Basic P&A” transaction today, an acquiring institution typically takes over all insured deposits 
and may take over uninsured deposits of the failed bank, along with its most liquid assets (this is 
sometimes called “Clean Bank P&A”). The acquirer has the option to buy loan pools or individual 
loans at book value within 30 days. Acquirers normally assume deposit liabilities at a premium (as 
cheap and stable funding), lowering the cost of resolution for the FDIC compared to payoff. The 
FDIC as receiver usually liquidates the bulk of the failed bank’s assets and pays claims against the 
receivership. Because the acquirer does not normally take over all bank assets and liabilities, basic 
P&A is associated with greater upfront cash outlays and administrative burdens for the FDIC than 
whole bank P&A, discussed next. 
• “Whole Bank P&A” became the FDIC’s preferred resolution method in the late 1980s, as the 
condition of the banking sector deteriorated and FDIC came to hold a growing volume of problem 
assets. Beginning in 1986, “[w]hen evaluating P&A bids, the FDIC gave priority to those transactions 
through which the highest volume of assets could be sold” (FDIC 1998, vol. 1, page 89). The transfer 
of assets and liabilities sometimes enabled the non-viable bank to bypass receivership altogether 
(GAO 1994). Although whole bank P&A requires less cash and administrative expense upfront for 
the FDIC, it typically costs the DIF more over time. Acquirers can and do submit negative bids. 
According to an FDIC review, at the peak of whole bank P&A activity, “[w]hole bank bids were 
almost always offered on an all-deposit basis,” protecting both insured and uninsured deposits. 
This approach raised moral hazard concerns and political exposure for the FDIC. From 1986 to 1991, 
uninsured deposits were protected in 72-88 percent of bank failures each year (FDIC 1998, vol. 1, 
pages 88, 94). As discussed in more detail below, the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) made 
it much harder for FDIC to use whole bank P&A and compensate uninsured depositors. 
 
As part of a P&A transaction, the FDIC may agree to share prospective losses on transferred assets with 
the acquirer using a negotiated formula. In a loss-sharing agreement, the FDIC would typically absorb 
80 percent of the losses, up to a cap, and may provide higher “catastrophic coverage” in selected cases. 
Acquiring banks may also offer to split the gains on transferred assets by issuing value recovery 
instruments to the FDIC. The FDIC developed loss-sharing in 1991 to reduce its asset management 
burden. The stated goal was to transfer as many non-performing assets as possible to private sector 
acquirers “in a manner that aligns the interests and incentives of the acquiring bank and the FDIC” (FDIC 
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1998, vol. 1, page 96). While efficient private sector asset management was and continues to be an 
important driver of the FDIC’s P&A methodologies, the development of loss-sharing was motivated in 
important part by the problems it encountered in resolving large banks with complex commercial and 
real estate loan portfolios, where potential acquirers had limited time to perform due diligence. 
Between 1991 and 1994, FDIC entered into loss-sharing agreements for sixteen banks that covered 
over $41 billion in assets; resolution costs ranged from zero to more than 25 percent of total assets (Id., 
page 97). 
The FDIC has the authority to charter a bridge bank to facilitate P&A. Bridge banks are used rarely, 
notwithstanding the recent high-profile case of IndyMac, resolved with a bridge bank during the 
financial crisis. A bridge bank buys the receiver time for due diligence and marketing, and entails 
substantially more administrative work for the FDIC. If the bridge bank is followed by P&A, the receiver 
transfers bank assets and liabilities twice: first, to the bridge bank, and second, to the eventual acquirer. 
However, forming a bridge bank does not limit the FDIC’s resolution options thereafter: for instance, it 
may also dispose of the bank in an IPO or liquidate it. Bridge banks are used when the FDIC can show 
“that the franchise value of the bank is greater than the marginal costs of operating the bridge bank.”38 
In FDIC payoff practice for much of the 20th century, uninsured depositors did not get paid until after 
asset liquidation. As discussed below, the FDIC has the authority to advance funds based on its asset 
recovery estimates. Delays can still happen, particularly when the FDIC cannot readily estimate 
recovery values. In July of 2008, uninsured depositors did not get immediate access to their funds after 
the sudden failure of IndyMac, which had an unusually large stock of uninsured deposits. Even after the 
FDIC established a bridge bank to manage the resolution, but deposit withdrawals continued for 
several weeks (FDIC 2017, page 197).  
The extent to which P&A may be used for large institutions and in future financial crises is uncertain. 
The FDIC detailed the challenges of using P&A to resolve larger IDIs (“large regional banks” in US 
regulatory parlance) in a recent rule proposal.39 Washington Mutual (WaMu) is the only contemporary 
precedent in that category; its assets stood at $307 billion when it failed in September of 2008; the next 
largest case, IndyMac, involved $30 billion in assets and was resolved using a bridge bank, as noted 
above. WaMu resolution caused substantial losses for its creditors and for the DIF, and also generated 
significant legal liability for its acquirer JP Morgan Chase, to an extent that had not been anticipated at 
the time of acquisition.40 It is uncertain whether this experience would deter future cases like WaMu. 
The Chief Executive of JP Morgan said publicly in mid-2018 that he “would do WaMu again” even with 
the benefit of hindsight.41 We return to the WaMu case later in our assessment of the US regime at the 
end of this section. 
Banking groups 
                                                             
38 FDIC Resolutions Handbook (2019), page 19. 
39 See section II.D of FDIC advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, “Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository 
Institutions with $50 Billion or More in Total Assets”, Federal Register, 22 April 2019, available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-04-22/pdf/2019-08077.pdf.  
40 JP Morgan Chase went as far to sue the FDIC, a case that was eventually settled in 2016. See Jonathan Stempel, “JPMorgan 
ends WaMu disputes with FDIC, to receive $645 million”, Reuters, 19 August 2016, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
jpmorgan-settlement-washing-mut-bk/jpmorgan-ends-wamu-disputes-with-fdic-to-receive-645-million-idUSKCN10U28M.  
41 See Matthew Kish, “Jamie Dimon on the economy, trade and whether he’d by WaMu again”, Portland Business Journal, 
30 July 2018, at https://www.bizjournals.com/portland/news/2018/07/30/jamie-dimon-on-the-economy-trade-and-wamu-
deal.html.  
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To limit the scope for asset concealment and balance sheet manipulation by insolvent bank owners, 
1989 legislation gave the FDIC authority to call on solvent banks within the same banking group to 
make up for any losses to the DIF in connection with the failed bank’s resolution.42 Banks thus “cross-
guarantee” the FDIC’s exposure to their affiliates. In effect, all IDIs within the holding company are 
treated as if they were one bank for purposes of compensating the DIF. If the receivership recovers 
sufficient assets to repay the guarantors, they are entitled to sixth-priority distribution, as discussed 
later in this subsection. However, in practice, the FDIC’s invocation of cross-guarantee liability triggers 
failure of the guarantor (e.g. Carnell et al. 2017, page 417-418). 
Least-cost test and national depositor preference 
Between 1951 and 1991, the FDIC had discretion to use any resolution method that was less costly than 
straight liquidation.43 FDICIA substantially constrained this discretion in 1991 by requiring the FDIC to 
use the resolution method least costly for the DIF. FDICIA also required the FDIC to develop a more 
rigorous cost assessment methodology, projecting loss to the DIF “on a present-value basis, using a 
realistic discount rate,” to document its reasoning and assumptions, and to undergo annual reviews of 
its resolution practice by the GAO, which functions as the investigative arm of the US Congress.44  
The least-cost requirement led to a sharp decline in the number of whole-bank P&A transactions and 
substantial increase in uninsured depositor losses. The number of whole-bank transactions fell from a 
peak of 69 in 1988, to 24 in 1991 and only five in 1992 (FDIC 1998, vol. 1, page 88). According to the 
GAO, uninsured depositors incurred losses in 14 percent of FDIC resolution cases in the three years 
before FDICIA, and in 49 percent of the cases in the year following enactment (GAO 1994). Uninsured 
depositors accounted for approximately 3 percent of all deposits throughout that period. 
The expectation that the least-cost requirement would result in losses for uninsured depositors was 
made explicit in public discussions surrounding the passage of FDICIA, and fuelled fears of runs. The 
FDIC as receiver made an effort to expedite the payment of uninsured deposit claims before it 
liquidated failed bank assets in cases where it could estimate asset recovery with reasonable 
confidence. The task was complicated by FDICIA’s new and relatively stringent data and valuation 
requirements, which required FDIC staff to develop new methodologies in a hurry.45 In the event, the 
runs did not materialise (GAO, 1994).  
Uninsured depositors, and the FDIC itself, also benefited from the enactment of national depositor 
preference in 1993. That year, federal budget legislation formally put all deposit claims—including 
those of the FDIC as insurer, standing in the shoes of insured depositors—ahead of general unsecured 
creditor claims against the receivership. Apparently motivated by Congressional interest in generating 
cost savings for the FDIC, depositor preference legislation did not occasion much public debate at the 
time of its passage (Marino & Bennett, 1999)—nor was tiered depositor preference actively considered 
in policy debates before or after the 1993 legislation. There is little evidence that the expected cost 
                                                             
42 FDIC Cross Guaranty Program, FDIC Press Release, last updated 30 October 2009, available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09195b.html. Banks that control, are controlled by, or are under common 
control with the bank in receivership are subject to cross-guarantee liability. 12 USC §1815(e) 
43 The FDIC first agreed to apply a cost test to its resolution practice in response to congressional pressure in 1951. A test 
incorporating the liquidation cost ceiling was formalised as part of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 
(FDIC 1984, page 87). 
44 At the time, the agency was called the General Accounting Office. It has since been renamed Government Accountability 
Office. The acronym has not changed.  
45 Separating insured and uninsured claims was a particular challenge. Under US deposit insurance legislation, the insurance 
coverage limit applies per institution, per depositor, per account category. Determining coverage for joint accounts was 
particularly time-consuming early on (GAO 1994); however, it remains a challenge to this day (FDIC 2017). 
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savings materialised in the years after enactment of depositor preference; however, the FDIC has found 
depositor preference useful savings materialised but has proven useful for the FDIC’s for its 
management of bank receiverships. We further elaborate on claim priorities later in this subsection. 
Systemic Risk Exception and Open-Bank Assistance 
FDICIA’s least-cost requirement contained an important exception for cases in which closing a bank 
“would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability,” as determined by 
the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President based on recommendations of two-
thirds supermajorities of the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC Board of Directors. Such a 
determination would trigger a “systemic risk exception”, which gave the FDIC authority to manage a 
non-viable bank using tools and methods that were not least costly to the DIF. 
So-called “open-bank assistance”—using FDIC lending authority to prevent, rather than to manage, 
bank closure—became one of the most controversial FDIC tools made possible by the systemic risk 
exception.  
Congress first granted the FDIC open-bank assistance authority in 1950 in response to concerns that 
the Federal Reserve might not be a reliable source of liquidity support, particularly for the smaller state-
chartered non-member banks (FDIC 1984, page 94; FDIC 1998, vol. 1, pages 152-153).46 The authority 
was limited to cases where the FDIC determined that keeping a troubled bank open was “essential” to 
maintain banking services in the community. The “essentiality” constraint left the FDIC plenty of 
discretion to define what was essential and what constituted a community. The constraint was relaxed 
further in 1982, to apply only where the cost of assistance exceeded the cost of liquidation.  
The FDIC did not use this lending authority at all until 1971, and used it only four times in the 1970s. 
Open-bank assistance skyrocketed in the 1980s, when it was used in 127 cases to facilitate bank 
mergers and famously to save banks deemed “too big to fail,” such as the Continental Illinois National 
Bank and Trust Company in 1984 (FDIC 1998, vol. 1, pages 82-83). While the FDIC developed successive 
policies to mitigate the risk of moral hazard, diluting shareholder interests and replacing management, 
it failed to dispel the perception of bailouts. Although the average cost of open-bank assistance 
transactions between 1980 and 1992 was 6.15 percent of the recipient bank assets, they peaked at over 
40 percent for a single institution in 1989 (FDIC 1998, vol. 1, page 103).  
Under FDICIA, open-bank assistance would have to comply with the least-cost test unless it qualified 
for the systemic risk exception. The new hurdle was high to reflected perceptions that bank 
shareholders benefited from government aid, which FDIC disputed. Nonetheless, the FDIC did not use 
the authority again after 1992, until the 2008 crisis, when a SRE determination was made for three big 
banks even as the FDIC was closing dozens of small institutions:  
• In September of 2008, the US federal authorities made a systemic risk determination for 
Wachovia, a $782 billion BHC whose real estate assets were rapidly deteriorating in crisis. To 
support Citigroup’s proposed acquisition of Wachovia, the US government assembled a 
financial assistance package, including FDIC guarantees against losses on asset pools 
potentially exceeding $300 billion. However, the guarantee was never extended thanks to a 
subsequent offer by Wells Fargo to acquire Wachovia without recourse to FDIC support.  
• In November of 2008, Citigroup received government assistance following the collapse of its 
Wachovia acquisition and further deterioration in Citigroup’s financial condition. The 
                                                             
46 The Federal Reserve opposed FDIC authority as an infringement on its own lender-of-last-resort function.  
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assistance package included FDIC guarantees for a $306 billion asset pool, made pursuant to 
the FDIC’s open bank assistance authority and the systemic risk exception to least-cost 
resolution.  
• The FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the US Treasury also went through the systemic risk 
determination process for Bank of America in anticipation of large losses from its acquisition of 
Merrill Lynch. In January 2009, the US government announced an assistance package that 
would have included US Treasury and FDIC protection against losses on a $118 billion asset 
pool. The announcement turned out to be enough to restore market confidence, and the 
Secretary of the Treasury never finalised the systemic risk determination for Bank of America 
(FDIC, 2017). 
Controversially, the FDIC also used the systemic risk exception to support the establishment of the 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), a fee-based program to guarantee transaction 
accounts and certain new debt issued by struggling (though possibly viable) banks and BHCs (GAO, 
2010). Together with a higher deposit insurance ceiling (raised from $100,000 to $250,000 in crisis, with 
retroactive effect, and maintained at that level ever since), these programs kept uninsured depositor 
losses to a minimum during the financial crisis.47 In response, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 eliminated 
the systemic risk exception for open-bank assistance to individual institutions and severely constrained 
FDIC emergency lending authority (Box 2). 
 
Box 2: Limits on FDIC emergency authority under the Dodd-Frank Act 
The FDIC committed over $1 trillion in guarantees at the height of the crisis.  
The DFA eliminated the FDIC’s authority to provide emergency financial support to individual institutions, 
except as part of a liquidation process: “[T]he [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation may take other action or 
provide assistance under this section for the purpose of winding up the insured depository institution for which 
the Corporation has been appointed receiver as necessary to avoid or mitigate such effects.” (12 USC 
§1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(II) (Our emphasis) 
FDIC retained authority to provide guarantees that are “widely available,” not targeted at individual institutions. 
Using this authority requires a determination of a “liquidity event” with a two-thirds supermajority approval by 
the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board, consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, and—unusually—a joint 
resolution of both houses of the US Congress. The FDIC has the authority to borrow from the US Treasury to 
fund its emergency support, the cost of which must be recouped from industry assessments. (12 USC § 5612) 
The DFA similarly limited the Federal Reserve’s emergency liquidity authority for nonbanks to programs with 
“broad-based eligibility.”  
The recent experience with the systemic risk exception and open-bank assistance may be 
unprecedented in scale, but it is not unique.48 The FDIC has a history of creative crisis interventions 
using authority granted decades earlier in very different circumstances. For instance, open-bank 
assistance was initially authorised as a way to help smaller banks, but ended up at the centre of the too-
big-to-fail controversies. Creative use of old authorities to support big banks revives perennial concerns 
                                                             
47 For a contemporary illustration of the effect on IndyMac, see e.g. Jim Puzzanghera and E. Scott Reckard, “Congress 
retroactively raises FDIC deposit insurance limits, aiding IndyMac account holders,” Los Angeles Times, 16 June 2010, at 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jun-16-la-fi-fdic-indymac-20100616-story.html. 
48 See the speech by FDIC Chief Operating Officer John F. Bovenzi, “Remarks on The Role of Deposit Insurance in Financial 
Crises: Past and Present”, given at the International Association of Deposit Insurers’s 7th Annual Conference, 29 October 2008, 
at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spoct2908.html.  
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about taxpayer subsidies, regulatory forbearance, and moral hazard; the powers granted by law 
become political liabilities, and are severely limited or discontinued. 
Contracts 
The FDIC as receiver has broad authority to enforce or walk away from the failed bank’s contracts. Its 
authority is more robust and subject to fewer outside controls (including judicial review) than a 
trustee’s authority in corporate bankruptcy proceedings under the US Bankruptcy Code.  
For instance, the FDIC may terminate contracts that are not completely performed at the time of the 
receivership if, within a reasonable time, it finds their performance “burdensome” and if doing so would 
promote orderly administration.49 Although it becomes liable for damages to the contract 
counterparty, its liability is more limited than it would be under contract doctrines that would apply 
outside the receivership.50 Critics of the receivership approach to bank insolvency have highlighted the 
receiver’s ability to “cherry-pick” contracts as unfair and potentially distortive.51  
The FDIC may raise the bar for enforcement beyond ordinary contract law requirements, for instance, 
rejecting oral contracts and contracts that are not proven with sufficient certainty. On the flipside, the 
FDIC can insist on enforcing contracts that by their terms give the counterparty the right to walk away 
if the bank is insolvent or is put in receivership.  
Claims 
The FDIC has broad authority to administer claims against the receivership. In its capacity as receiver, 
it solicits and reviews proof of claims (subject to judicial review) and, for claims in litigation at the time 
of the bank’s failure, it can avail itself of procedural tools unavailable to other parties. 
Receivership assets do not belong to the FDIC. Each claim recognised as valid by the FDIC is entitled to 
its share of the receivership liquidation proceeds, consistent with priorities summarised in Box 3 below. 
However, the FDIC may pay claims out of its own funds before liquidating receivership assets, and even 
before the deadline for filing proof of claims has passed, for instance, to discourage an uninsured 
depositor run. It may pay some creditors more than their likely share of the estimated liquidation value 
of the receivership, for instance, if it expects higher recovery from P&A. The US Congress clarified that 
the FDIC had no obligation to use its own funds—as distinct from receivership funds—to pay all 
similarly-situated creditors a pro rata share of its ultimate recovery, so long as creditors are paid at least 
what they would receive in liquidation (payoff).52  
  
                                                             
49 12 USC §1821(e)(1)-(2) 
50 For example, the receiver would not be liable for consequential damages and certain penalty provisions. 
51 Qualified Financial Contracts (QFCs) are treated differently from other contracts in FDIC bank receivership, as well as under 
FDIC Orderly Liquidation Authority and in bankruptcy, as discussed later in this section. The category of QFCs covers most 
derivatives, repurchase (repo) agreements, and a range of other short-term funding instruments that get similarly special 
treatment in bankruptcy motivated by the desire to maintain market liquidity. (But see Morrison, Roe & Sontchi (2014), arguing 
that excluding such contracts from the bankruptcy process exacerbates systemic risk.) When the FDIC as receiver repudiates 
an ordinary contract, damages are measured as of the date of the FDIC’s appointment, even though the receiver might take 
six months to decide whether to repudiate. When it repudiates a QFC, damages are measured as of repudiation date, and may 
include the counterparty’s cost of replacing the QFC. The stated objective of different treatment is “to protect US financial 
markets.” FDIC Resolutions Handbook (2019), pages 28-29. 
52 12 USC §1121(d)(10)(B) 
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Box 3: Liquidation Priorities 
The FDIC as receiver must first determine whether a claim is valid and allowed based on proof of claim presented 
before its deadline. If FDIC determines that the claim is allowed, it is paid from the assets of the receivership in 
liquidation in the following order: 
1. Secured Debt (up to collateral value; remaining portion is paid with general unsecured, unsubordinated 
claims below) 
2. Administrative Expenses of the Receivership 
3. Depositors, Insured and Uninsured (includes FDIC, stepping in the shoes of insured depositors) 
4. General Unsecured, Unsubordinated Claims  
5. Subordinated Debt 
6. Cross-Guarantee Claims 
7. Equity 
Lower-priority claims are not paid until claims senior to them are paid in full. If the receivership does not have 
enough assets to pay lower priority claims (e.g. if there is only enough to pay insured depositors), the FDIC does 
not need to determine the validity of the claim. The FDIC’s maximum liability as receiver is limited to what the 
claim would have received in liquidation; it may, but has no obligation to, use its own funds to share some of the 
higher recoveries from P&A transactions with claimants against the receivership. Creditors have no claim against 
the FDIC’s own funds in excess of what they would have received in liquidation, even if similarly situated creditors 
may receive more as a consequence of P&A. This is the functional equivalent to the BRRD’s no-creditor-worse-off 
principle.  
2.5 Orderly Liquidation Authority  
As we highlight at the start of this section, virtually all US banks are owned by nonbank BHCs. The 
prevalence of the BHC structure has helped shape the US approach to non-viable banks in many ways.53 
However, while non-viable banks could be put in an FDIC receivership, their parent BHCs could only 
liquidate or reorganise under the US Bankruptcy Code, a federal judicial process.  
A BHC bankruptcy filing triggers the creation of a bankruptcy estate overseen by a bankruptcy trustee, 
and launches a public liquidation or reorganisation proceeding before a bankruptcy court staffed with 
specialist judges. Creditors can and do challenge pre-bankruptcy transfers, and have the right to vote 
on reorganisation plans. Counterparties under Qualified Financial Contracts (QFCs), such as swaps and 
repurchase agreements, can immediately terminate their contracts and seize collateral when the 
debtor files for bankruptcy. A debtor in bankruptcy has no access to government liquidity, although it 
may borrow from private lenders with court approval, and offer them distribution priority. Bankruptcy 
court procedures include notice, disclosure, and confirmation requirements that can extend for 
months. For a large firm, bankruptcy reorganisation can easily take several years. 
Many commentators have observed that this process as it stands is ill-suited to the operation of BHCs 
and other diversified financial conglomerates. The public nature of the proceeding, the long time 
frames, the uncertainty surrounding the fate of pre-bankruptcy contracts and transfers (including 
among affiliates) can easily hurt confidence and lead to runs on bank subsidiaries. Diversified 
conglomerates face the additional challenge of regime fragmentation, since in the United States, 
                                                             
53 Among the long-established implications of the holding company form, BHCs are required to serve as a “source of strength” 
for their IDI (bank) subsidiaries, and IDIs within the same holding company are liable to the FDIC for losses associated with 
resolving affiliated IDIs. 
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banks, securities broker-dealers, and insurance firms, are all subject to different federal, and in the case 
of insurance firms, state, regimes for handling non-viability, with different safety nets and 
accountability channels. Fragmentation and conflicts are further magnified for global diversified 
conglomerates.  
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing in September of 2008 shocked global markets. Together with 
the US government rescue of the insurance conglomerate AIG the next day, the Lehman episode 
prompted the US Congress to establish Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) under the Dodd-Frank Act 
of 2010 for non-bank firms whose bankruptcy would pose a systemic risk. Congress responded to 
federal officials’ contention that they had no authority to address the crises at Lehman Brothers and 
AIG without causing large-scale damage. The stated objective of OLA therefore was to avoid the binary 
choice between disruptive bankruptcy and taxpayer “bailout,” and to create an incentive-compatible 
process suited to large financial conglomerates. The result is a hybrid, melding features of US-style bank 
resolution and corporate bankruptcy—but ultimately much closer to resolution (Scott & Gelpern, 
2018). OLA has similarities with the EU resolution process under BRRD, which it predates.  
Bankruptcy remains the default option for non-viable nonbank financial firms, including BHCs. The 
language of Title II of the DFA establishing OLA, and all the official pronouncements surrounding the 
legislation and subsequent regulation, emphasise that OLA is an alternative only available in cases 
where the supermajorities of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve boards, and the Secretary of the 
Treasury in consultation with the President, publicly certify that putting the financial firm through 
bankruptcy would threaten the system. The credibility of this bankruptcy-first commitment is untested.  
Also untested is OLA’s commitment to liquidation, which is part of its name, but stands in some tension 
with its other stated objectives. On the one hand, OLA creates the possibility of FDIC receivership for 
nonbanks, largely preserving the administrative flexibility the FDIC enjoys as receiver for IDIs. This is 
consistent with the objectives of preserving continuity in systemically important activities, including 
payment processing, clearing, and consumer activities (for example, ATM withdrawals), preserving the 
value of the firm, and minimising the spillover effects of firm failure on asset prices and institutions. On 
the other hand, the explicit requirements of liquidating the firm in OLA, penalising its management, 
and ruling out any losses to taxpayers complicate the path to achieving continuity.  
Invocation of OLA 
Under OLA, the FDIC may be appointed receiver for the liquidation of a “covered financial company.” 
Covered firms are broadly defined to include BHCs, broker-dealers, insurers, systemically important 
nonbank firms designated for enhanced federal supervision, and others predominantly engaged in 
activities “financial in nature” —covering an expansive range of financial services. The definition 
excludes IDIs. Unlike “systemically important financial institutions” designated under the DFA, covered 
financial companies are not designated in advance—it is possible for a firm to be systemically 
important in death, even if it had not been recognised as such in life.  
To invoke OLA, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President, and two-thirds of then-
serving members of each of the Federal Reserve and FDIC boards must independently determine, 
among other criteria: that the firm is in default or in danger of default; that its failure and resolution 
under other available authority, such as bankruptcy, “would have serious adverse effects on the 
financial stability in the United States”; that the effect of OLA on creditors would be appropriate in light 
of the threat to financial stability; and that no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent 
default. Neither the firm nor its creditors know until the eve of resolution whether they would be 
subject to OLA or bankruptcy, and the rules of these procedures differ.  
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Section 165(d) of DFA required bank holding companies with consolidated assets of more than $50 
billion, and systemically important nonbank firms designated for enhanced federal supervision, to 
submit to the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC plans for their “rapid and orderly resolution” (see 
Section 1 on semantics) under the US Bankruptcy Code, without recourse to government financial 
support. Such plans require fairly detailed assessment of firm structure, operations, and financial 
exposures, which should help make both bankruptcy and OLA proceedings more efficient and less 
disruptive. Regulatory relief legislation in 2018 raised the mandatory resolution planning threshold to 
$250 billion, and left resolution planning requirements for banks with $100-$250 billion in assets to the 
discretion of the Federal Reserve Board. Between October 2018 and April 2019, the Federal Reserve and 
the FDIC proposed a series of measures to relax bank regulatory burdens, particularly for large and mid-
size regional bank and BHCs. The proposals include completely eliminating resolution planning for 
banks and BHCs with under $250 billion in assets, and reducing the frequency of full resolution plan 
submissions from yearly to once every six years for banks with assets over $250 billion that are not 
global systemically important banks, as defined by the FSB. These actions could have implications for 
a substantial portion of the US banking sector and the US regime for non-viable banks in the next 
financial crisis. Firms exempted from resolution planning would include BB&T, Sun Trust, American 
Express, and M&T Bank. For comparison, as mentioned above, the largest FDIC resolution case during 
the crisis of 2002-2009 was WaMu, a thrift with $307 billion in assets at the time of its failure, which 
accounted for 45 percent of all assets resolved by the FDIC during the crisis and caused substantial 
losses to the DIF (FDIC 2017, page 199).54 
The OLA Receivership Process 
OLA imports many of the core features of the US system of IDI resolution. For instance, it gives the FDIC 
broad discretion, including capacity to discriminate to some extent among similarly situated creditors, 
and limiting judicial review. Bankruptcy-like features in OLA include a recovery floor (creditors must 
receive no less than bankruptcy liquidation) and more favourable treatment of contingent claims and 
certain contracts. 
Derivatives and certain other QFCs continue to benefit from special exemptions in OLA as they do in 
bankruptcy and in IDI receiverships, but the treatment in OLA is different. In bankruptcy, a QFC 
counterparty may close out the contract and seize its collateral notwithstanding the freeze on creditor 
enforcement (“automatic stay”) triggered by the bankruptcy filing. While QFC counterparties in OLA 
might face a one business-day delay in terminating and collecting on their contracts, the FDIC has the 
option of transferring all QFCs with a given counterparty to a solvent entity, which could be a bridge 
bank. The FDIC must either transfer or repudiate the entire book of QFCs with a single counterparty, it 
may not pick and choose among the failed firm’s contracts. In the event of a transfer, the counterparty 
should recover in full.55 Apart from QFCs, FDIC retains the authority to select (“cherry-pick”) contracts, 
including financial contracts, assumed by the surviving firm, similar to its cherry-picking authority in 
bank resolution.56  
                                                             
54 For background on the proposal and the list of institutions expected to be covered, see Memorandum for the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve from Governor Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chairman for Supervision, 24 October 2018, available 
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/files/board-memo-20181031.pdf. For criticism of this and 
related proposals, see Letter from the Systemic Risk Council to Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell and FDIC Chair Jelena 
McWilliams, 16 July 2019, available at https://www.systemicriskcouncil.org/2019/07/systemic-risk-council-urges-federal-
reserve-and-fdic-not-to-relax-resolution-planning-requirements-for-large-us-regional-banks/.  
55 12 USC §1821(e)(8), (9), (11). 
56 The US Treasury proposed limiting and clarifying this authority in its February 2018 report on OLA; the report also proposed 
shifting substantially from public to private funding for the resolution process (US Treasury, 2018).  
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The Dodd-Frank Act establishes an Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF), which unlike the DIF, is not pre-
funded with fees from participating firms. The OLF has borrowing authority from the US Treasury, 
which is limited to 10 percent of the book value of total consolidated assets of the firm in receivership 
during the 30-day period after the FDIC’s appointment, and to 90 percent of the fair (market) value of 
the firm’s total consolidated assets thereafter. The Secretary of the Treasury must approve FDIC 
borrowing for the OLF. The FDIC must determine that OLF funding is in the interest of US financial 
stability; prepare an orderly liquidation plan that accounts for the funding; and, if the funding exceeds 
10 percent of the covered company’s assets, it must agree on a repayment plan with the US Treasury. 
OLF has repayment priority ahead of all unsecured creditors of the receivership. If receivership 
proceeds are not enough to repay OLF in full, it is compensated with ex post levies on institutions 
receiving emergency assistance and/or systemically important institutions.57  
Following DFA adoption, the FDIC gradually developed its framework for resolving a systemically 
important firm under OLA, which later became the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) Resolution Strategy. 
Under SPOE, the FDIC would intervene at the holding company level, preserving operating subsidiaries 
as going concerns. Loss-absorbing capital and liabilities at the holding company level, consistent with 
Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) requirements as defined by FSB standards, would be used to 
ensure the survival of its subsidiaries. In receivership, the FDIC would establish a bridge financial 
company to take over most of the holding company’s assets, including its equity in the operating 
subsidiaries. If a firm is resolved in OLA rather than bankruptcy, its management must be removed. 
The bridge financial company would be capitalised by bailing in the shareholders and creditors of the 
holding company. The bridge company would eventually be sold to private creditors. The FDIC 
expressed its intent to rely on private funding for liquidity in the SPOE framework, but would have the 
ability to advance short-term liquidity from OLF and provide guarantees to private creditors for the 
bridge company. 
In contrast to the BRRD framework, “bail-in” under OLA and SPOE does not take the form of a pre-
determined haircut for shareholders and creditors of a non-viable but still-open firm. Instead, 
shareholders are the first in line to absorb losses from the receivership, followed by creditors, who are 
expected to become shareholders in the bridge company. Thus “bailed-in,” the creditors would be paid 
later from the eventual proceeds of the sale of the company. The amount of losses to be absorbed 
depends on the sale price of the firm or its assets. The availability of OLF liquidity and FDIC guarantees 
for creditors of the bridge financial company represent another point of distinction.58 
The SPOE approach suits the BHC form that prevails in the United States. At least in theory, it can 
maintain continuity of functions for the operational subsidiaries, and the franchise value of the group. 
However, SPOE has been criticised as a backdoor bailout for large firms in contravention of the spirit of 
OLA authority, since the bridge financial company essentially preserves the failed group—albeit under 
different management. In addition, OLA’s dependence on having sufficient TLAC at the holding 
company level continues to elicit scepticism.59 The identity of TLAC investors and their ability to absorb 
losses without triggering contagion magnifies such concerns. Industry critics and policy makers have 
also criticised FDIC’s broad discretion as OLA receiver, and its ability to treat similarly-situated creditors 
                                                             
57 DFA Sec. 210(n). Pre-funding proposals in the US Congress were defeated on moral hazard grounds. 
58 A 2018 US Treasury report describes the operation of the current US OLA and SPOE framework in detail. US Department of 
the Treasury (2018), pages 8-12. 
59 e.g. Lubben & Wilmarth (2017), and Simon Johnson, “The Myth of a Perfect Orderly Liquidation Authority for Big Banks,” New 
York Times, 16 May 2013, available at https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/the-myth-of-a-perfect-orderly-
liquidation-authority-for-big-banks/.  
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differently (subject to the liquidation recovery floor), much as it does in IDI receiverships, with limited 
scope for judicial review (US Treasury 2018). Concern about administrative discretion and 
accountability has animated proposals to add dedicated provisions for bank bankruptcy to the US 
Bankruptcy Code. 
2.6 “Chapter 14”: Bank Bankruptcy Proposals 
A dedicated US Bankruptcy Code chapter for financial institutions, Chapter 14 (currently unclaimed), 
would address concerns about FDIC administrative discretion and doubts about the viability of existing 
bankruptcy laws as the default option for BHCs under the DFA.60 Early Chapter 14 proposals argued for 
eliminating OLA. Most recently, legislative proposals and the US Treasury report on OLA reform issued 
in February 2018 supported the bankruptcy proposal, but argued against repealing OLA.  
As embraced by the U.S Treasury report, Chapter 14 would move away from the purely administrative 
process overseen by the FDIC, severely limiting its ability to “cherry-pick” among similarly situated 
creditors, introducing procedural constraints and transparency requirements, and opening up the 
process to judicial review (albeit endorsing the idea of specialised bankruptcy judges with expertise in 
the financial industry). Critics of Chapter 14 argue that bankruptcy proposals for large, systemically 
important financial institutions ignore financial and political realities. Dealing with distress in such an 
institution would require large-scale funding, which would have to be mobilised quickly, and which 
would most likely come from the public sector (e.g. Levitin, 2018). Chapter 14 proposals debated in the 
US Congress have not included access to OLF, relying instead on priority private sector lending; 
however some Chapter 14 supporters have spoken in favour of OLF access (e.g. Skeel, 2018). Public 
funding would come with strings attached as a matter of political accountability. In 2008-2009, 
government intervention came in conflict with contractual priorities.  
The Trump administration and some members of the US Congress have expressed support for Chapter 
14 legislation; however, it remains technically and politically contentious, and is unlikely to be adopted 
soon.  
2.7 Summary assessment 
As noted in the introduction, this study stops well short of a comprehensive assessment of the US 
regime. The following points, however, strike us as particularly relevant for EU policymakers.  
The FDIC’s public-facing activities are the tip of the resolution iceberg 
The public communication of the FDIC centers on the retail account-holder experience. That priority 
enhances the salience of the “resolution weekend” during which a bank is closed, its business is sold to 
a peer, and the customers maintain continuous access to banking services and to their deposits. This 
section illustrates that the FDIC’s work long before that weekend, typically three months ahead – and 
possibly earlier when it comes to assessing the bank’s soundness under the FDIC’s backup supervisory 
mandate. The FDIC’s work also continues afterwards, for as long as it takes to unwind the receivership. 
The intervention weekend is the central point of reference in the resolution process, but not necessarily 
when the most critical decisions are made.  
Ahead of bank closure, franchise marketing and due diligence by the prospective acquirer(s) is 
especially critical. The FDIC’s experience of franchise marketing, developed over decades, is one of the 
agency’s critical skills. Equally important is FDIC staff experience at valuing and disposing of a wide 
                                                             
60 E.g. Mark J. Roe and David A. Skeel, Jr., “Bankruptcy for Banks: A Sound Concept that Needs Fine-Tuning,” The New York 
Times, 16 August 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/business/dealbook/bankruptcy-for-banks-a-
sound-concept-that-needs-fine-tuning.html. 
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array of assets in the receivership process, which can happen over moths or even years, but can also 
involve difficult trade-offs, especially in times of market turmoil, of selling early and possibly at a 
distressed price, versus holding for longer with further downside risk. Legislative interventions since 
the 1950s have prompted the FDIC to become more rigorous and accountable in its valuation and asset 
management. 
In sum, the FDIC’s public image is primarily of a crisis manager, but its actual professional identity is 
very largely that of an asset manager – selling bank franchises (at the time of closure, following the 
weeks of franchise marketing) and rump assets (from the receivership) at the best possible price under 
the least-cost requirement.  
The FDIC has credibility in both its deposit-protection mandate and in fostering market discipline 
This section shows that there have been multiple debates over the years in the United States, just as in 
the EU, about the moral hazard involved in banking rescues. The FDIC’s mandate and tools have been 
fine-tuned over 80 years. The least-cost test under FDICIA in 1991 was a key milestone, supported by 
the introduction of national deposit preference in 1993. Overall, this framework has passed the test of 
the 2007-2009 crisis with considerable success, especially for small and medium-sized banks, and the 
FDIC has emerged from the crisis with its mandate expanded to OLA receiverships, and with its public 
stature elevated. The FDIC has been unfailing in its core role of protecting deposits, creative in crisis, 
and at the same time steadfast in its promotion of market discipline under legislatively mandated least-
cost requirement.  
This credibility means different things in normal times and in times of systemic turmoil. In normal times, 
the FDIC is able to apply its burden-sharing framework, all the way to imposing losses on uninsured 
depositors to minimise costs to the DIF. The (relatively few) cases of idiosyncratic bank failures it had 
to handle between 1993 and 2007, and since the financial crisis, attest to this proposition. In times of 
system fragility, the balance is inevitably different, but the principle of fostering market discipline 
remains. At the height of the financial crisis in 2008, the FDIC effectively extended protection to all 
deposits, but imposed losses on Washington Mutual (WaMu)’s senior unsecured creditors against the 
advice of the Federal Reserve as vividly recounted by the principal actors (Bair, 2012; Geithner, 2014).  
WaMu’s creditor losses sent a signal to investors that they could not take for granted that senior bank 
debt would be repaid, even at the worst of times. This stands in vivid contrast to the EU, where no losses 
have been incurred by senior bank creditors in any but very tiny or very rare and atypical cases that 
generally involve severe misconduct (such as Hypo Alpe Adria in Austria, or Laiki Bank in Cyprus).  
The OLA framework offers plausible responses to the challenges of bail-in and of liquidity in resolution 
Unlike the BRRD framework, which mandates creditor haircuts and requires pre-positioned liquidity to 
keep the large firm open, the US OLA regime starts with the presumption of liquidation. Although SPOE 
may not deserve the label “liquidation” chosen by the DFA’s drafters—it looks more like open-bank 
resolution—it can offer a streamlined approach to burden-sharing, if implemented to that end. When 
the non-viable company’s assets are transferred to the bridge company, shareholders presumptively 
take first losses, and creditors take on the risk that remaining assets will not be enough to repay them 
in full. There is no US equivalent to the possible contribution of a resolution fund in “solvency support” 
after bailing in 8 percent of own funds and eligible liabilities. While some in the United States view the 
bridge company as circumvention of the DFA’s liquidation mandate, in the EU context, which has no 
liquidation mandate, it may turn out to be simpler than the BRRD’s method of bailing in the failing 
bank’s shareholders and creditors. 
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The availability of OLF liquidity combined with the conditions on its use—in particular, the link 
between the eventual sale price of non-viable company assets and the FDIC’s lending and borrowing 
authority—reduce the pressure to find private sector liquidity, and may ultimately make it easier for 
the bridge company to secure liquidity in the private markets. Whether the current TLAC requirements 
at the BHC level will suffice for effective future resolution remains to be seen. Nonetheless, combining 
FDIC receivership authority with access to US Treasury liquidity through OLF, as with the combination 
of receivership with insurance functions in the case of IDIs, goes a very long way to addressing the 
challenge of liquidity in resolution, in contrast to the current situation in the EU.  
The FDIC is still untested on the Too-Big-To-Fail side of its mandate 
OLA, however, like its EU counterpart, is untested – in contrast to the FDIC’s tried and tested playbook 
for small and medium-sized banks. In 2011, the FDIC published research suggesting OLA would have 
allowed it to handle the Lehman case with some success (FDIC, 2011), but this remained very much a 
paperboard exercise. The FDIC approach has evolved since, not least with the SPOE resolution strategy. 
There has been no actual case of OLA yet.  
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 THE EU REGIME AND ITS EARLY EXPERIENCE 
3.1 Development during the crisis 
Pre-crisis development of national regimes for non-viable banks in EU member states followed many 
diverse paths, and is beyond the scope of this study. At the EU level, there was no meaningful 
framework before the transatlantic financial crisis erupted in mid-2007.61  
Events unfolded gradually from the start of crisis in mid-2007, in four partly overlapping phases: first, 
ad hoc national rescues, with generous use of public money;62 second, uncoordinated national 
legislation on resolution regimes;63 third, catching up belatedly with the latter, an attempt at EU 
harmonisation resulting in the European Commission’s proposal for BRRD published in early June 2012 
(on which more detail below); and fourth, the banking union sequence (Gordon and Ringe, 2015). The 
latter started with the landmark euro area summit of 28-19 June 2012, that memorably affirmed “It is 
imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” and decided on the creation of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the direct bank recapitalisation instrument of the 
European Stability Fund (ESM, see below). The eventual outcome was the SSM Regulation of October 
2013, creating a centralised prudential supervisory framework controlled by the ECB;64 the legislative 
elaboration of the DGSD and BRRD, enacted respectively in April and May 2014; and the SRMR of July 
2014.  
The euro area had created the ESM as a quasi-fiscal instrument for mutual assistance, established in 
Luxembourg in 2012 with €500 billion lending capacity. The early decision to empower the ESM to 
recapitalise banks directly was quickly watered down, however, and more recently reversed. The ESM 
is nevertheless to act as a financial “backstop” to the Single Resolution Fund (see below) on the basis 
of a political decision made in late 2013.  
The legislative history of BRRD is particularly relevant to this study, and started several years before 
banking union. Its inception can be traced to a European Commission communication of October 2009 
(COM (2009) 561), partly inspired by the UK Banking Act of the same year. In May 2010, the Commission 
recommended the establishment of national bank resolution funds (COM (2010) 254), and in October 
2010, it outlined a framework of resolution powers and tools at the national level that prefigures the 
BRRD proposal (COM (2010) 579). In the meantime, the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns 
gradually became evident for all to acknowledge,65 and that gradual realisation directly led to the major 
political breakthrough that gave birth to banking union in late June 2012. As a consequence, the 
legislative discussion of the BRRD happened in parallel with that of the two founding texts of the 
banking union, the SSM Regulation and the SRMR. These three legislative acts proceeded in quick 
succession, and are often perceived as part of a single coherent banking union agenda, even though 
the BRRD’s conception predates that of the banking union by several years. The initiation of banking 
                                                             
61 The main exceptions were a 1994 directive on DGSs (94/19/EC) and a 2001 directive on the reorganisation and winding up 
of credit institutions (2001/24/EC). But the former left almost all modalities of deposit insurance at the discretion of member 
states, and the latter was mostly limited to assigning jurisdiction to individual national authorities in the case of a non-viable 
cross-border bank.  
62 A choice was explicitly made at the highest political level, at the climax of the financial crisis in early October 2008, to keep 
bank crisis management at the national level and not seek an integrated approach at the European level: see Bastasin (2015), 
Chapter 1.  
63 Prominent examples included the UK Banking Act 2009 and the German Restructuring Act of December 2010.  
64 The description and assessment of the SSM is outside the scope of this study.  
65 See e.g. Véron (2016) for an analysis of the gradual recognition of the bank-sovereign vicious circle.  
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union was followed by significant changes in BRRD through the legislative discussion, however, 
including the eight-percent bail-in condition for intervention of a (national or European) resolution 
fund as explained below, and the decision to bring forward the date of applicability of bail-in from 2018 
(as initially proposed by the European Commission) to 2016.  
The BRRD is a product of distinct political choices on the part of EU policy makers, drawing on a 
multiplicity of international influences. Its resolution model took direct inspiration from the UK and 
from work developed at the global level under the aegis of the FSB that culminated in the “Key 
attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions” (FSB, 2011). The key attributes also 
drew significantly on the FDIC’s experience. The decision to leave NBIPs untouched came both as a 
choice of priorities (focusing on the larger banks) and as a political compromise (leaving the framework 
unchanged for most banks, including all small local ones). After the start of banking union and the 
political decision to create an SRM, the concern to minimise the use of European-level funds, entailing 
the possibility of asymmetric distributional effects among member states, gained salience. That 
concern drove some of the choices eventually made, including the emphasis placed on administrative 
bail-in at the point of non-viability. Some of the legislation’s provisions, including the 8-percent bail-in 
condition, resulted from last-minute negotiated compromises that were not subjected to an extensive 
process of policy assessment. The SRMR’s legislative history, not detailed here, is briefly presented in 
Véron (2019).  
In May 2019, the European Union enacted changes to BRRD and SRMR, respectively Directive (EU) 
2019/879 and Regulation (EU) 2019/877, mostly about adopting the FSB’s standards on TLAC and 
correspondingly elaborating the “minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities” (MREL) 
in BRRD. These were part of a broader “banking package” whose main thrust was the adoption of the 
Basel III accord on the prudential regulation of banks. An earlier amendment to BRRD adopted in 2017 
(Directive (EU) 2017/2399) had introduced some modest steps of harmonisation in the ranking of 
unsecured debt instruments in insolvency. In April 2019, the European Commission adopted a report 
on the BRRD and SRMR (COM(2019) 213), which concluded that “it is premature to design and adopt 
legislative proposals at this stage” that would go beyond the changes introduced by the banking 
package, even as it suggests more analytical work to come in this area.  
Aside from the SRM and BRRD, the other key component of the EU regime for non-viable banks that is 
enshrined in EU law is the state aid control framework. In this area, the legislation has remained 
constant – it is simply the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and specifically its 
Article 107(3) as explained in the next subsection. What has evolved, however, is the European 
Commission’s enforcement doctrine and case law. The first landmark case of state aid control in the 
banking sector was the European Commission’s actions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, following 
complaints by the Association of German Private Banks and the European Banking Federation, which 
led to the abolition by the German government of pervasive explicit government guarantees on 
publicly-owned regional banks known as Landesbanken (Moser, Pesaresi and Soukup, 2002). From 
there, the Commission has developed its state aid control practice, and from 2008 it published several 
successive indicative documents (known as Banking Communications, the most recent in July 2013) 
setting out its approach to state aid control in the banking sector in the specific context of the financial 
crisis. The Banking Communication 2013 is further analysed below.  
The three other components of the EU regime, namely, bank insolvency proceedings, deposit 
insurance, and mutual support arrangements, remain essentially at the national level, even after the 
partial harmonisation of deposit insurance by the DGSD of 2014. There have been multiple changes in 
these components since the crisis started in 2007, but the corresponding country-specific 
developments are beyond the scope of this study.  
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3.2 The current EU regime in brief 
Our analysis of the EU regime for failing banks identifies five main components: national bank 
insolvency proceedings; the EU resolution framework, including the SRM in the banking union; deposit 
insurance; state aid control; and national mutual support arrangements. This taxonomy is relevant for 
a holistic assessment of the EU regime, attempted below in Subsection 3.4. The rest of this subsection 
is descriptive and primarily intended at non-EU readers. It will presumably be familiar material for 
experienced EU practitioners.  
National Bank Insolvency Proceedings 
Before the enactment of BRRD, the regime for non-viable banks in the EU fell entirely within member 
state purview, and thus consisted of a collection of diverse NBIPs. BRRD complements but does not 
supersede NBIPs, referring to them as “normal insolvency proceedings” (“normal” refers to their default 
status), while defining resolution as an exception to be justified by public-interest considerations (see 
below). A detailed description of NBIPs is forthcoming in a separate study commissioned by the 
European Commission.66 In the meantime, only partial comparative surveys are available: Baudino, 
Gagliano, Rulli and Walters (2018) review Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, the UK, and 
several non-EU jurisdictions including the United States;67 Binder, Krimminger, Nieto and Singh (2019) 
mainly review Germany, Spain, the UK, and the United States.  
In line with established EU practice, and as explained in Section 1, in this portion of the study we reserve 
the word “resolution” (sometimes “EU resolution” for clarity) for the process established by BRRD under 
EU law. But it is important to keep in mind that NBIPs in several member states provide for a 
substantially similar administrative procedure, typically with less stringent requirements for burden-
sharing among liability holders. For example, the Italian procedure known as liquidiazione coatta 
amministrativa, translated as Compulsory Administrative Liquidation (CAL) by the SRB, “provides for an 
administrative procedure quite close to resolution” (Kenadjian, 2019). In its landmark decisions in late 
June 2017 not to trigger resolution action in the cases of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca 
(see below), the SRB concluded that CAL proceedings can achieve the objectives of protecting 
depositors, investors, client funds and client assets, as set in EU law, “to the same extent” as resolution 
would have.68  
NBIPs are subject to national legislative change in the respective national jurisdictions. Unlike EU law, 
for which the legislative cycle typically takes at least a year and often much longer, national legislation 
in most EU member states can be passed in a matter of days in response to an emergency situation.  
Bank resolution: BRRD and the SRM 
The BRRD applies to the entire European Internal Market comprising the EU and other countries of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), beyond the banking union’s geographical scope which is currently 
limited to the euro area.69 It stipulates that a national resolution authority must exist in each EU/EEA 
                                                             
66 Study on the differences between bank insolvency laws and on their potential harmonisation: tender available at 
https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-display.html?cftId=4021. One of the authors (Véron) participates on behalf of 
Bruegel in the team that is working on the Commission study.  
67 Restoy (2019) adds France, Germany and Spain to that analysis.  
68 Decisions SRB/EES/2017/11 (Veneto Banca) and SRB/EES/2017/12 (Banca Popolare di Vicenza): Section 4.2 of the non-
confidential versions, both available at https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.  
69 At the time of writing, the EU comprises 28 member states, including the United Kingdom whose future continued 
membership is uncertain. The European Economic Area (EEA) includes three additional member countries of the European 
Free Trade Association, namely Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The euro area comprises 19 countries, all EU member 
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member state, backed by national resolution financing arrangements, e.g. a resolution fund. It 
establishes, among other things, processes for resolution planning; criteria and procedures for “early 
intervention” by supervisors on fragile but still viable banks; criteria for aid to such banks such as 
liquidity guarantees and “precautionary recapitalisation”; the “public interest” criteria and process 
under which a supervisor (or resolution authority) may declare a bank FOLTF; and the criteria and 
process under which resolution authorities may place a FOLTF bank under resolution, in which case 
they must decide on a “resolution scheme” that makes “no creditor worse off” than they would have 
been in a hypothetical NBIP scenario (assuming no state aid in the latter).  
Importantly, the BRRD imposes a condition that 8 percent of a bank’s own funds and “eligible” liabilities 
(under criteria detailed by the BRRD) should be bailed-in before resolution funds could be mobilised 
for support. This clause is referred in this study as the BRRD’s “8-percent bail-in condition”. 
Correspondingly, the BRRD enjoins resolution authorities to set MREL requirements to make the bail-
in condition more credible and operable in case of resolution. As Subsection 3.3 below illustrates, this 
framework of bail-in and MREL remains almost entirely untested, however, and largely unpredictable 
(Huertas, 2019).  
The SRM only applies to the countries of the banking union. It is composed of the SRB and of the 
relevant national resolution authorities. The SRB was established by the SRMR as an autonomous EU 
agency, and became operational in 2015-16. Its direct remit (“SRB banks”) includes all euro-area banks 
with more than €30 billion of total assets, plus some more under criteria set by the SSM Regulation and 
SRMR. The SRB is the primary resolution authority for SRB banks, in the sense that it leads their 
resolution planning; decides on whether to take resolution action if an SRB bank is declared FOLTF 
(either by the ECB or by the SRB itself), following its Public Interest Assessment (PIA) based on criteria 
set by the BRRD/SRMR; and if resolution action is undertaken (i.e. a positive PIA), decides on a resolution 
scheme, which however can be challenged or modified by the European Commission and/or the 
Council (which brings together all EU member states) before being implemented. The SRMR also 
stipulates that the “execution” of the resolution scheme is carried out by the relevant national 
resolution authority or authorities. The resolution of non-viable smaller banks (i.e. those that are not 
SRB banks) remains the responsibility of the relevant national resolution authorities, but the SRB has a 
coordinating role within the banking union area.  
Under conditions, the SRB can use the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), financed by a levy on banks 
collected by the national resolution authorities. The SRF is established by the SRMR, but its assumption 
and mutualisation of national funds are set in a separate Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) that is 
formally outside of the EU legal framework.70 The national resolution funds of euro-area countries, as 
defined by the BRRD, are being gradually mutualised within the SRF, a process that is scheduled for 
completion in 2024. 
The SRB has had a somewhat difficult start (ECA 2017; Véron 2019) even though it had a broadly 
successful first resolution decision with Banco Popular Español in June 2017 (see below). The SRF is in 
the process of being built up, and had reached nearly €25 billion as of mid-2018.71  
The SRM still has a number of loose ends, even apart from the fact that the scope of resolution in the 
euro area has turned out to be significantly more limited than initially envisaged (see below). The 
                                                             
states. Two additional countries, Bulgaria and Croatia, have started a process to adopt the euro as their currency, which will 
first entail voluntarily joining the banking area through a procedure set in the SSM Regulation as “close cooperation”. Other 
EU member states may apply for close cooperation in the future, be it or not as part of a process to adopt the euro.  
70 The SRF IGA is available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%20INIT.  
71 Source: SRB website, at https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/single-resolution-fund.  
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backup supervisory mandate of the SRB, which the BRRD and SRMR establish as similar in scope to that 
of the FDIC in the US (including the authority to conduct inspections and to declare a bank FOLTF), 
does not appear to have been operationalised yet (IMF 2018, Véron 2019). The SRF in principle will be 
“backstopped” by the ESM, by 2024 at the latest; but arrangements negotiated in 2018-1972 make this 
support more conditional and quantitatively limited than the FDIC’s expansive borrowing authority 
from the US Treasury, which underpins the US DIF and OLF. Furthermore, the SRB, unlike the FDIC with 
the DIF and especially the OLF, still lacks sufficient formal arrangements to provide liquidity to banks 
in resolution, a matter which is currently being actively discussed.73 There are also diverging views as 
to the ultimate decision-making autonomy of the SRB (e.g. Lintner 2017). In particular, it remains 
somewhat unclear whether the SRB is independent enough for the EU regime to be compliant with the 
key attributes of effective resolution regimes set at the global level by the Financial Stability Board (IMF 
2018, paragraph 34, and FSB 2011, paragraph 2.5).  
Deposit insurance 
With the implementation of the DGSD of 2014, each EU member state has a compulsory DGS that 
insures deposits up to a harmonised limit of €100,000. In some member states, several DGSs coexist, 
covering different categories of banks.74 In addition, some member states, such as Italy and Germany, 
have “voluntary” or “top-up” deposit insurance covering all or a subset of banks, which are private-
sector arrangements not covered by the DGSD – we include them below in what we call mutual 
support arrangements.  
Article 108 of BRRD stipulates that insured (“covered”) deposits have priority over other deposits in 
resolution. Within the latter category (non-covered deposits), an additional distinction is made for 
deposits “from natural persons [i.e. individuals] and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises,” which 
have priority over other deposits or, for that matter, other creditors. This stands in contrast with general 
depositor preference, as it has existed in the United States since 1993, under which all deposits have 
preferred status relative to other creditors and rank equally among themselves.  
In some (not all) member states, the national DGS can provide support for the restructuring or closure 
of troubled banks beyond the mere insurance of covered deposits. This is enabled on a broad basis by 
Article 11(6) of DGSD, which states that “Member States may decide that the available financial means 
may also be used to finance measures to preserve the access of depositors to covered deposits, 
including transfer of assets and liabilities and deposit book transfer, in the context of national 
insolvency proceedings, provided that the costs borne by the DGS do not exceed the net amount of 
compensating covered depositors at the credit institution concerned.” The status of such “alternative 
measures” under state aid control is not settled. In March 2019, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union ruled, against an earlier decision by the European Commission, that financial support by the 
Italian DGS may not be considered state aid.75 This ruling, however, has been appealed by the 
                                                             
72 See ESM press release, “Explainer on ESM reform and revisions to the ESM Treaty”, 24 June 2019, available at 
https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/explainer-esm-reform-and-revisions-esm-treaty.  
73 See e.g. Deslandes and Magnus (2018).  
74 The full list and key statistics are available on the European Banking Authority’s website at https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-
and-policy/recovery-and-resolution/deposit-guarantee-schemes-data.  
75 General Court of the EU, “The General Court annuls the Commission’s decision that support measures adopted by a 
consortium governed by private law for the benefit of one of its members constituted ‘aid granted by a State’”, Press Release 
34/19, Luxembourg, 19 March 2019, available at https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-
03/cp190034en.pdf. 
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Commission.76 Restoy (2019) compares the scope for alternative measures in ten EU/EEA member 
states, and also discusses the consequences of above-mentioned “tiering” of deposits by Article 108 of 
BRRD and especially of the “super-priority” granted to covered (insured) deposits.  
In November 2015, the European Commission has published a legislative proposal for a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS; COM (2015) 586). This proposal has been blocked so far in the 
legislative process. We come back to EDIS, and its current absence, later in this study.  
State aid control 
State aid control is another core component of the current EU regime for non-viable banks. Its only 
legal basis is the TFEU, and specifically its Article 107(3) on categories of state aid that “may be 
considered to be compatible with the internal market”, supplemented by case law and the European 
Commission’s own public guidance, namely the Banking Communications.77 In particular, Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU mentions as one of the acceptable categories “aid to promote the execution of an 
important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of 
a Member State”. Most banking-sector aid that has been authorised (with conditions) by the European 
Commission falls under this primary objective “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”.  
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Banking Communication 2013 (2013/C 216/01), whose full title is 
“Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis” (our emphasis), are worth 
quoting in full:  
“5. The persistence of tensions in sovereign debt markets forcefully illustrates the continued volatility in 
financial markets. The high level of interconnectedness and interdependence within the financial sector in 
the Union continues to give rise to market concerns about contagion. The high volatility of financial markets 
and the uncertainty in the economic outlook and the resulting persistent risk of a serious disturbance in the 
economy of Member States justifies maintaining, as a safety net, the possibility for Member States to grant 
crisis-related support measures on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty in respect of the financial sector.  
6. In those circumstances of persisting stress in financial markets and given the risk of wider negative spill-
over effects, the Commission considers that the requirements for the application of Article 107(3)(b) of the 
Treaty to State aid in the financial sector continue to be fulfilled. The application of that derogation remains, 
however, possible only as long as the crisis situation persists, creating genuinely exceptional circumstances where 
financial stability at large is at risk.” (Our emphasis.) 
Under this umbrella assessment, the Communication lists several types of measures:  
• “Recapitalisation and impaired asset measures”, also referred to in the Communication as 
“restructuring aid” and known more colloquially as solvency support,78 for which the 
Communication imposes conditions that include burden-sharing by the bank’s shareholders 
(typically wiped out) and subordinated creditors (typically converted to equity with an initial loss); 
the Communication, however, does not impose burden-sharing on senior creditors, let alone 
depositors.  
                                                             
76 See Francesco Guarascio, “In blow to Italy, EU’s Vestager appeals ruling over bank rescue”, Reuters, 29 May 2019, available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-banks-tercas/in-blow-to-italy-eus-vestager-appeals-ruling-over-bank-rescue-
idUSKCN1SZ25U.  
77 The validity of the Banking Communications as guidelines for the Commission’s state aid control has been tested and 
confirmed in court: Court of Justice of the EU, “The Communication from the Commission on aid to the banking sector is valid”, 
Press Release 80/16, Luxembourg, 19 July 2016, available at https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-
07/cp160080en.pdf.  
78 We generally avoid in this study the even more colloquial term “bail-out”, which is used too loosely in public debates to be 
associated with a specific category of public financial support.  
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• “Guarantees and liquidity support outside the provision of central bank liquidity”, which are 
considered “rescue aid” (a broader category than “restructuring aid”) and constrained by the 
Communication but don’t entail burden-sharing. Unlike restructuring aid, this kind of state aid is 
only available for “banks without a capital shortfall”.  
• “Provision of liquidity by central banks and intervention of deposit guarantee schemes” which are 
typically not considered state aid, under conditions specified by the Communication.  
• “Interventions by a resolution fund” which are presumed to be state aid, without further 
elaboration in the Communication.  
• “Liquidation aid” to facilitate “the exit of non-viable players” and entail the same burden-sharing 
conditions as restructuring aid.  
In addition, in the case of the two Veneto banks (see below, Subsection 3.3), the Commission has 
recently come to the conclusion that member states may offer compensation to retail victims of 
misselling by their bank; subject to conditions, it does not consider such compensation to be state aid.79  
It may be debated to which extent the Commission’s overall crisis assessment, explained in the Banking 
Communication 2013 as quoted above, still applies under current market conditions and thus still 
supports the authorisation of state aid “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”. Should the 
Commission revise it, the scope for state aid in the banking sector would be considerably reduced. The 
European Commission has given no indication of its future stance in this respect.  
As things currently stand, the burden-sharing conditions of BRRD resolution are more onerous than 
those of state aid control, since they include the 8-percent bail-in threshold that may imply losses 
imposed on unsecured creditors and even possibly uninsured depositors. But should the European 
Commission (or for that matter, hypothetically, the Court of Justice ruling on a Commission decision) 
determine that the financial crisis is over and thus that Article 107(3)(b) TFEU no longer applies, then 
the BRRD’s 8-percent bail-in condition would no longer be, as now, more stringent than state aid 
conditions – unless other clauses of Article 107 TFEU may be invoked, but that is unlikely in most 
cases.80  
National mutual support arrangements 
By national mutual support arrangements, we refer loosely to diverse schemes that exist in a small 
number of member states, most prominently in Germany and Italy.81 Such schemes may cover some or 
all domestic banks, and may be binding or non-binding, temporary or permanent.82 National mutual 
support arrangements include “institutional protection schemes” (IPSs), which get specific recognition 
in the EU Capital Requirements Regulation; voluntary deposit insurance schemes that come on top of 
mandatory DGSs; and various ad hoc arrangements. The IPSs of Germany’s public banks and 
cooperative banks, respectively, are major pillars of the German banking sector. The voluntary (“top-
up”) deposit insurance operated by the German private bank association (known by the German 
acronym BDB) is another significant example. Italy’s ill-starred Atlante fund of 2016 was a case of ad 
                                                             
79 See Francesco Guarascio, “EU, Rome agree draft deal to soften bail-in rules on Italy banks: source”, Reuters, 5 April 2019, at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-banks-regulations/eu-rome-agree-draft-deal-to-soften-bail-in-rules-on-italy-banks-
source-idUSKCN1RH1UC.  
80 Indeed it is not clear that, in the absence of the need to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”, state aid control 
could authorise any intervention of a resolution fund, even after 8-percent bail-in.  
81 In other member states, e.g. Austria and Spain, mutual support arrangements exist but cover a smaller share of the national 
banking sector.  
82 No such schemes currently exist on a cross-border basis, unless of course the SRF is viewed as a mutual support 
arrangement. By convention, we also exclude mandatory DGSs (as defined and harmonised by DGSD from this category.  
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hoc arrangement, technically voluntary but explicitly sponsored by the national government.83 A 
voluntary component of the Italian DGS was also set up in 2016.  
Mutual support arrangements typically allow for financial assistance to one bank from its peers without 
that assistance being subject to state aid control. On the face of it, this is appropriate since these are 
voluntary arrangements among commercial entities.84 What is unclear, and so far untested, however, 
is what would happen if the entire arrangement were to come under financial strain. There may be a 
widespread presumption that, at least in some cases, the national government would come to the 
rescue. Thus, not only are mutual support arrangements part of the regime for non-viable banks in 
those member states where they exist; they may also benefit from a perceived national public 
guarantee, even as this is difficult to quantify – and is also arguably not certain enough to be viewed as 
state aid, or to justify a ratings uplift.  
As we note in Section 2 and have elaborated in earlier work (Gelpern & Véron 2018), a number of US 
states experimented with formal and informal mutual support arrangements in the 19th century, and 
again between 1908 and the Great Depression. While limited-membership, unlimited-liability schemes 
were more effective at containing bank losses and controlling risk-taking, most failed, and in some 
cases, contributed to contagion (e.g. Calomiris & White 1994, Vickers 1994). Federal deposit insurance 
became politically palatable in the early 1930s partly owing to the perception that smaller-scale, 
undiversified alternatives were doomed to fail, inflicting large losses on depositors and creditors. We 
are not aware of US state (let alone federal) rescues of failing mutual support arrangements since the 
Civil War. However, the fact that such failures did entail what might be considered under TFEU as 
“serious disturbance in the economy”, combined with the greater propensity in the EU to provide 
financial support to protect systemic stability, gives plausibility to the expectation that failing mutual 
support schemes in the EU would receive national government assistance, at least for the largest ones.  
3.3 Application of the EU regime since 2014 
As always with crisis management arrangements, the EU regime for non-viable banks has to be judged 
on practical experience and not only on intent and statements of principle – even those that are 
enshrined in law. Since we view the BRRD and SRMR as important components of the regime, however, 
the relevant cases are only those that came after the BRRD’s entry into force in mid-2015. Earlier cases 
of bank rescues or restructuring have only limited precedent value to help investors and other 
stakeholders anticipate future decisions, including those that were completed after the entry into force 
of BRRD but had started before.85 Because our analysis focuses on non-viable banks, it also leaves aside 
cases of interventions in banks that were not deemed to have reachedthe point of non-viability, 
irrespective of whether state aid was granted.86  
                                                             
83 See Rachel Sanderson and Martin Arnold, “Italian banks: The rescue mission”, Financial Times, 15 April 2016, at 
https://www.ft.com/content/f52f1ca6-02ec-11e6-af1d-c47326021344.  
84 In the case of an IPS, the incentives to provide mutual support to a non-viable member go beyond consideration of an arm’s-
length transaction. This is because IPS membership entails derogations from prudential requirements under EU law, such as 
exemptions of intra-IPS exposures from credit risk-weighting and from leverage ratio calculations, and discounted 
contributions to the SRF. A failure to provide support would entail a risk of derecognition of the entire IPS and therefore loss 
of these derogations. 
85 These cases include Banco Espirito Santo / Novo Banco in Portugal, Cooperative Bank in Cyprus, Hypo Alpe Adria / HETA in 
Austria, and HSH Nordbank in Germany.  
86 Such cases of banks that were troubled but deemed viable include those of National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank in 
late 2015 (Greece, both precautionary recapitalisations); Monte dei Paschi di Siena in July 2017 (Italy, precautionary 
recapitalisation); and Carige in early 2019 (Italy, early intervention). At least in the case of Monte dei Paschi, there have been 
suggestions that the bank benefited from supervisory forbearance, namely that the ECB should have declared it FOLTF in 
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With this in mind, all relevant EU cases of which we are aware are listed below. Of these, only Popular, 
the two Veneto banks and ABLV were SRB banks.  
• Banks that were resolved by national authorities in the second half of 2015, after BRRD’s entry into 
force but before its 8-percent bail-in condition became applicable on 1 January 2016: Jadranska 
Banka Sibenik (Croatia, October 2015); Banca delle Marche, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio, 
Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara, CariChieti (Italy, November 2015); Cooperative Bank of Peloponnese 
(Greece, December 2015); and BANIF (Portugal, December 2015).  
• Andelskassen JAK Slagelse and København Andelskasse: deemed FOLTF by the Danish Financial 
Supervisory Authority in January 2016 and in September 2018 respectively, and resolved by the 
Danish resolution authority (Finansiel Stabilitet) following positive PIA. The resolution involved, 
respectively, a sale of business (to Netfonds) and the creation of a bridge bank (FS Finance VI). No 
state aid was involved in either case.  
• Banco Popular Español: deemed FOLTF (for illiquidity) by the ECB, and resolved by the SRB in June 
2017 following positive PIA. The bank was sold to Santander for a nominal price of one euro. No 
state aid was involved. Multiple lawsuits are ongoing.  
• Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca (known as the “Veneto banks”): deemed FOLTF (both 
for insolvency) by the ECB in June 2017, with a negative PIA by the SRB resulting in their treatment 
through the Italian NBIP known as compulsory administrative liquidation (see above). Most 
operations of the two banks were taken over by Intesa Sanpaolo, which associated liquidation aid 
in the form of nearly €5 billion in cash injections and €12 billion (maximum) in government 
guarantees, backed by the Italian State’s senior claims on the assets in liquidation.87 In addition, 
retail former shareholders and creditors that are deemed victims of past misselling by the two 
banks will be partly compensated.  
• ABLV: deemed FOLTF (for illiquidity following the publication by the US government of findings 
deeming it “of primary money laundering concern”) by the ECB in February 2018, with a negative 
public interest assessment by the SRB. The group’s parent entity was liquidated under the Latvian 
NBIP. The Luxembourg affiliate was found by a local court not to meet the criteria for liquidation 
under Luxembourg’s NBIP, then continued to operate for some time as a consequence (under the 
name ABLV Bank Luxembourg SA), but has eventually entered a process of liquidation.88  
• Smaller (non-SRB) banks that were handled through NBIPs: Maple Bank (Germany, liquidated by 
BaFin in February 2016); Trasta Komercbanka (Latvia, license withdrawn by the ECB in March 2016); 
Nemea Bank (Malta, put under public administration in April 2016); Banka Splitsko-Dalmatinska 
(Croatia, license withdrawn by the Croatian resolution authority in May 2016); several Polish credit 
unions liquidated by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority in 2016-17; several Lithuanian 
credit unions liquidated by the Bank of Lithuania in 2017-18; Tesla Stedna Banka (Croatia, license 
withdrawn by the Croatian resolution authority in February 2018); Dero Bank (Germany, liquidated 
by BaFin in March 2018); Versobank (Estonia, license withdrawn by the ECB in March 2018); Banca 
Sviluppo Economico (Italy, liquidated in April 2018); Pilatus Bank (Malta, license withdrawn by the 
ECB in November 2018).89  
                                                             
2016. See Elisa Martinuzzi, “What the ECB Didn’t Say About Monte Paschi’s Bailout”, Bloomberg, 30 June 2019, at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-opinion-monte-paschi/.  
87 European Commission press release, “State aid: Commission approves aid for market exit of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and 
Veneto Banca under Italian insolvency law, involving sale of some parts to Intesa Sanpaolo”, Brussels, 25 June 2017, available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1791_en.htm. 
88 See ABLV announcement, “To minimise further losses ABLV Bank Luxembourg, S.A. has agreed to the start of the judicial 
liquidation process”, 26 June 2019, at https://www.ablv.lu/en/press/2019-06-26-to-minimise-further-losses-ablv-bank-
luxembourg-s-a-has-agreed-to-the-start-of-the-judicial-liquidation-process; and Laura Fort, “La mise en liquidation d’ABLV 
prononcée”, Paperjam, 2 July 2019, at https://paperjam.lu/article/mise-en-liquidation-ablv-luxem.  
89 See EBA website at https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/recovery-and-resolution/notifications-on-resolution-
cases-and-use-of-dgs-funds for relevant public notifications.  
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It is noteworthy that almost none of these cases are in the EU’s three largest economies and banking 
systems, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom (namely, two cases of German private 
banks). This may be related to the highly concentrated structures of the banking sectors in France and 
the UK, with few small or medium-sized banks left following extensive consolidation in recent decades 
(including the first few years of the crisis); and to the “three-pillar” structure of the German banking 
system, with many small banks in the public and cooperative pillars but covered by mutual support 
arrangements,90 and a fairly concentrated private pillar broadly as in the British and French cases.91  
Inevitably, some cases have been more controversial than others. In some member states, e.g. Austria 
and Germany, there are widespread perceptions that the granting of state aid without 8-percent bail-
in, for example in the two Veneto banks’ case, represented a breach of BRRD. This opinion, however, 
fails to recognise the fact that BRRD only governs EU resolution, not NBIPs, and grants wide discretion 
to the SRB for its public interest assessment. Conversely, the de facto exemption from BRRD resolution 
strictures for banks that participate in IPSs is often perceived, in member states were IPSs are not much 
or at all developed, as a damaging distortion and a breach of market discipline.  
3.4 Summary assessment 
The following observations are intended to highlight selected salient features of the EU regime for non-
viable banks, as informed by the summary description above.  
In the euro area, NBIPs are emerging as the rule and resolution as the exception  
The first observation that leaps from the cases since 2016 is the fact that the SRB made a negative 
public-interest assessment in several cases involving sizeable banks, particularly the two Veneto banks 
(each of them with total assets around €30 billion), thus directing them to the relevant NBIPs. This 
decision, taken together with the SRB’s positive PIA on Banco Popular Español (whose assets at the 
time of resolution were close to €150 billion) a few weeks earlier, gave the first concrete indication of 
the actual scope of resolution in the euro area and suggested it might be restricted to fairly large banks, 
typically with total assets above €100 billion92 – even as other criteria than size are expected to be taken 
into account in future PIA decisions. As the then chair of the European Banking Authority,93 Andrea 
Enria, commented, "the decision that there was no EU public interest at stake in the crises of two ECB-
                                                             
90 The number of German cooperative and public (savings) banks has declined regularly over recent years, but the operation 
of the respective IPSs makes it hard to determine from outside which if any of the disappearing (merged) banks were non-
viable.  
91 Even in Germany’s private-sector “pillar”, mutual support arrangements are more developed than in France or the UK. For 
example, in March 2015, troubled Düsseldorfer Hypothekenbank was rescued and taken over by the BDB’s deposit guarantee 
fund, which also compensated the depositors of Maple Bank and Dero Bank well above the EU’s €100,000 minimum. See 
Hanno Mussler, “Bankenverband übernimmt Bank in Not”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 March 2015, 
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/bankenverband-uebernimmt-duesseldorfer-hypothekenbank-13486643.html; 
Georgina Prodhan, “Germany’s BaFin declares Maple Bank an indemnification case”, Reuters, 12 February 2016, at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/maple-bank-bafin/germanys-bafin-declares-maple-bank-an-indemnification-case-
idUSL8N15R26D. Also in Germany, the state aid control decision on the proposed rescue of NordLB, a regional public bank 
(Landesbank), is still pending at the time of writing.  
92 Based on The Banker data, there are fewer than 40 euro-area banking groups with total assets above €100 billion, and an 
additional 20-odd with assets between €60 billion (combined assets of the two Veneto banks) and €100 billion. SRB banks are 
about twice as numerous: they include around 114 “significant institutions” directly supervised by the ECB, (as of 1 June 2019, 
list at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/who/html/index.en.html ), plus 11 “cross-border groups” 
added by the SRB’s own determinations (as of 12 June 2019, list at 
https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/12_june_2019_list_of_other_cross-border_groups.pdf).  
93 The European Banking Authority is an EU agency that was established in 2011 and plays a coordinating role on banking 
regulatory matters in the EU/EEA, including the regime for non-viable banks. It has no direct authority on individual bank 
cases, however, except in highly restrictive conditions of crisis that have never been activated so far.  
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supervised banks that were hoping to merge and operate in the same region with combined activities 
around €60 billion sets the bar for resolution very high."94 The SRB decision is made more striking by 
the contrasting stance of the Danish FSA, which made a positive PIA despite the two above-listed 
banks’ tiny size.  
On the face of it, the SRB’s decision to set a “high bar” for resolution is aligned with BRRD, which states 
that “A failing institution should in principle be liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings” 
(recital 45).95 It stands in contrast, however, with the public rhetoric that accompanied BRRD, which had 
tended to highlight the EU resolution process as the solution to future banking crises and especially as 
the device that would avoid future use of taxpayers’ money for bank rescues. In this regard, there is an 
inherent tension in the current regime. On the one hand, when the SRB makes a public-interest 
assessment by comparing a resolution scenario with a NBIP scenario, the latter must assume no state 
aid (and similarly, no state aid is assumed in the NBIP side of the no-creditor-worse-off determination). 
On the other hand, state aid may be provided in NBIP, to a greater extent than in resolution given the 
European Commission’s current state aid control stance as described in the previous subsection. This, 
combined with the significant litigation risk associated with resolution (as illustrated by the case of 
Banco Popular Español, which generated scores of lawsuits), creates powerful incentives for the SRB to 
lean on the side of a negative PIA. In other words, in theory the SRB must assume no state aid in its 
public interest assessment, but in practice, the prospect of state aid may influence its decision. Similarly, 
in theory the no-creditor-worse-off principle is applied assuming no state aid in NBIP, but in practice, 
the prospect or likelihood of such aid may influence the SRB’s stance. Future developments of SRB 
practice will depend on the gradual build-up of MREL buffers, on the evolution of the state aid control 
stance, and on the evolving features of NBIPs and propensity of individual member states to grant state 
aid and/or to encourage or discourage mutual support arrangements.  
The latter point deserves further elaboration. Past cases suggest that several, perhaps most, individual 
member states have a preference for public support over fostering market discipline (or in colloquial 
terms, “bail-out over bail-in”) in actual cases, even when their general rhetoric leans towards the 
protection of taxpayers’ money. A case in point was the reported (though unconfirmed) German 
government plan to acquire a 25 percent equity stake in Deutsche Bank when its soundness was 
questioned by investors in 2016.96 Motivations may include a combination of “banking nationalism”, or 
the propensity of national governments to protect or promote national banking “champions” in the EU 
competition; and “financial repression”, or a government’ propensity to leverage the domestic banking 
sector to direct credit towards itself (e.g. through “captive” purchases of domestic government bonds) 
or towards preferred borrowers or sector for motives of social, industrial, or other policies. Surely, there 
are also cases that point in the opposite direction of no appetite for state aid, such as Banco Popular 
Español, ABLV, or the smaller Danish banks; but these are not prevalent enough to indicate a sense of 
direction.  
As for the European Commission’s future stance on state aid control in the banking sector, there is an 
evident disconnect between public perceptions in several member states, which view the Commission 
as excessively strict in its enforcement practice, and our reading of the Banking Communication 2013, 
                                                             
94 See Silvia Sciorilli Borrelli, “Europe’s top bank watchdog makes case for optimism”, Politico, 5 July 2017, at 
https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-top-bank-watchdog-makes-case-for-optimism/.  
95 The SRB has further explained its approach to PIA in a brief document published in July 2019, available at 
https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/2019-06-28_draft_pia_paper_v12.pdf.  
96 See Arno Schuetze, “German government prepare Deutsche Bank rescue plan: Die Zeit”, Reuters, 28 September 2016, at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-bank-bailout-idUSKCN11Y0XI.  
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which is that its assessment of a general state of financial crisis (allowing for claims that state aid may 
“remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”) may render the whole stance more permissive than 
suggested in the Treaty. That stance could be challenged from a political and/or a legal perspective, 
and may evolve with new leadership at the European Commission. If the assumption of crisis and the 
corresponding reference to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU is removed, then the balance between resolution 
and NBIPs could shift significantly. Conversely, if the current stance is extended, more member states 
might optimise their NBIPs to facilitate the treatment of future cases of bank non-viability with state 
aid, and that could lead the SRB to further “raise the bar” for its public-interest assessment.  
A somewhat vexing consequence of the current situation is the contrast between what may be 
respectively termed the ex-ante and ex-post public-interest assessment. A significant number of EU 
banks are subject to resolution planning and, as a consequence, to MREL requirements that go beyond 
their minimum capital requirements (in the euro area, these include all SRB banks). Demanding MREL 
requirements could generate potentially crippling challenges for those banks which have been 
described as the “middle-class”, too large to escape them but too small to issue subordinated debt 
instruments on attractive terms (Restoy 2018). If it turns out that such “middle-class” banks are not likely 
to receive a positive PIA in case of non-viability, as the case of the Veneto banks suggests, then the 
wisdom of this framework must be questioned. The recently adopted revision of BRRD (new Article 45c 
BRRD, in Directive (EU) 2019/879) attempts to address this issue by prioritising so-called “top-tier” 
banking groups, those with consolidated assets above 100 billion euro, plus so-called “fished” banks 
designated by national authorities, for stringent requirements on subordinated MREL. It remains to be 
seen, however, to which extent this category will remain aligned with positive PIA decisions by the SRB 
in future cases of bank non-viability.  
The current regime perpetuates the bank-sovereign vicious circle 
As described above, implicit national public financial commitments are pervasive in the current regime, 
well beyond the obvious point that deposit insurance remains national in the absence of EDIS. Many 
(though not all) member states have exhibited a propensity to use the leeway for public support to the 
maximum extent allowed by BRRD and/or state aid control; NBIPs potentially offer a lot of space for 
public financial support, even as the BRRD resolution framework does not. Thus, the observed wide 
preference for NBIP over resolution in the euro area contributes to the perpetuation of large implicit 
national guarantees on domestic banking sectors, and as a consequence, to the bank-sovereign vicious 
circle which the banking union was intended to break.  
As observed above, mutual support arrangements also participate in the same dynamic even if no state 
aid is involved, to the extent they may be perceived as implicitly guaranteed by the national 
government – at least for the larger ones. (Mutual support arrangements that in aggregate don’t cover 
a significant share of the national banking sector, such as Spain’s cajas rurales or Italy’s banche di credito 
cooperativo, may not be viewed as benefiting from such implicit guarantee.)  
Anticipations of government support, of course, can only be amplified by situations of actual systemic 
fragility. Thus, if the NBIP allows for greater public financial intervention than resolution, there should 
be no expectation that, in a crisis, the boundary between resolution and NBIP would shift in favour of 
resolution. On the contrary, it is plausible that crisis-related legislative changes would make NBIPs more 
flexible so as to escape the tight structures of BRRD (and of the SRM regulation and intergovernmental 
agreements on the SRF, which also refer to the 8-percent bail-in condition). In a new systemic crisis 
situation, moreover, the state aid stance may be further relaxed by the European Commission.  
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 EU REFORM OBJECTIVES AND POLICY OPTIONS 
The dust has not settled yet on the EU regime for non-viable banks as framed by the legislation adopted 
in 2013-14. While the previous section suggests that NBIPs play a larger role than envisaged by many 
reformers at the time, this may still evolve, not least if the European Commission tightens its state aid 
control stance, and also with the gradual build-up of additional MREL buffers. Even so, there is a case 
for proactive consideration of further reform to address the regime’s apparent flaws. Given the severity 
of the last crisis, it is not self-evident that the EU can weather the next one (if and when it erupts) with 
its current lopsided policy framework.  
The following points on possible reform are made in that proactive spirit. Here again, no attempt is 
made at exhaustive coverage of all issues, let alone at providing a comprehensive reform blueprint. 
This section only aims to highlight selected elements that appear relevant in light of the analysis 
presented in the two previous sections.  
The successes and failures of the evolving US regime for non-viable banks can usefully inform EU 
choices, but the respective historical paths of the EU and the US are also fundamentally different. The 
US started with political and (to a large extent) fiscal union, and took a long time to build its banking 
union. Safety nets for the banking system were patchy to non-existent for a long time. In the EU, by 
contrast, the banking union is ahead of fiscal let alone political union. National safety nets for banks are 
generally strong, so strong in some cases that they leave too little room for market discipline – but also 
potentially undermined by doubts about sovereign creditworthiness, which has not been an issue for 
the US federal government as the backstop funder of the FDIC’s DIF. Despite the differences, however, 
the US experience is useful in shedding light on some of the costly pitfalls of managing bank distress 
and bank failure against the background of two centuries of institutional experimentation.  
4.1 Countering forbearance 
The introduction in BRRD of an explicit, harmonised process to pull the proverbial trigger on a non-
viable bank represents significant progress compared with antecedent frameworks in most EU member 
states. It clarifies the responsibility of bank supervisors and strengthens the overall market discipline in 
the system. The collapse of banks such as IKB, RBS or Dexia in 2007-08 prompted governments or their 
agencies to buy these banks’ shares at unrealistically high prices. Such a blunt form of rescue 
intervention has become unthinkable. Even so, the temptation of forbearance still exists for 
supervisors.  
In the United States, the primary and backup supervisory authorities of the FDIC play an essential part 
in the system of checks and balances that make the regime reasonably effective. The FDIC, motivated 
by its responsibility for the DIF, provides a fairly effective check on any primary supervisors’ propensity 
towards forbearance. This mechanism does not appear to go too far in the opposite direction of 
premature intervention: there is no compelling evidence of any US authority moving too precipitously 
to close a bank – whereas forbearance has always been, and remains, a pervasive challenge. Further 
consolidation of FDIC authority to include savings and loan (thrift) institutions between 1989 and 2010 
was in important part a response to thrift regulators’ forbearance propensities and reputation for 
political capture, and the insolvency of both state and federal thrift insurance schemes.97  
                                                             
97 The Office of Thrift Supervision, formerly a separate prudential supervisor, was merged into the FDIC by the Dodd-Frank 
Act.  
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Empowering the SRB on FOLTF determination independently from the ECB was thus a wise choice on 
the part of EU legislators. It still needs to be put into practice, however (Véron 2019). The ECB is 
unsurprisingly wary of having its assessments second-guessed by an independent SRB, but that would 
enhance the effectiveness of the regime as a whole.  
4.2 Protecting deposits 
The creation of the FDIC following the bank runs and national banking holiday episodes in 1933 was 
the foundational act of the contemporary US regime for non-viable banks. Although many of the tools 
used by the FDIC throughout its history predate its establishment, that establishment shifted the 
emphasis dramatically. It is highly significant that deposit protection is central to the name (and the 
mandate) of the authority which is itself central to the whole US regime, and has from the start 
combined deposit insurance with acting as receiver for non-viable banks. The balance between deposit 
protection and the need to limit its cost to the public has adjusted over time, for instance, when federal 
law expanded the scope for burden-sharing by uninsured depositors with a rigorous least-cost 
requirement in 1991, and restricted it again in 1993 with national depositor preference. By placing 
insured deposits (and by extension the DIF as their subrogee) on a par with uninsured ones in the 
ranking of liabilities in resolution, national depositor preference creates powerful incentives for the 
FDIC to minimise losses to uninsured depositors. In practice, US deposit protection is both ironclad for 
insured deposits, and extensive for uninsured ones. It is fair to say that enshrining deposit protection 
as the de facto organising principle of the entire regime has served the United States well for close to a 
century.  
Despite the disruption and suffering brought on by the transatlantic financial crisis that began in 2007, 
the EU has never had a traumatic collective experience that would compare with the US national bank 
holiday of early March 1933. The EU has gradually adopted and strengthened the principle of deposit 
protection, but neither wholeheartedly nor unconditionally – as illustrated by the fiasco of mid-March 
2013 in Cyprus, when the European Commission, ECB and IMF endorsed a decision to breach the 
national deposit insurance as a condition for the assistance programme, only for it to be reversed a few 
days later by the Cypriot parliament.  
The key missing link, of course, is EDIS – an EDIS that should provide an unconditional and 
unambiguous insurance of all covered deposits irrespective of location in the euro area, i.e. completely 
insulated from national institutions (except as automatic payoff/payout agents) and from national 
politics. This suggests that EDIS should be operated by the SRB. Beyond the principle of ironclad 
insurance and the SRB assignment, the design of EDIS, including the important question whether the 
insurance fees should be differentiated by country, is outside the scope of this study.98 But as the US 
experience suggests, deposit protection goes beyond the scope of statutory insurance, with 
implications for financial stability. In its reflections on future reform, the EU should re-examine the case 
for adopting the US principle of general and pari passu depositor preference, as opposed to its complex 
three-level tiering of differential seniority for covered deposits, deposits of SMEs and natural persons, 
and other deposits that may (depending on national law) rank no higher than senior creditors.99  
                                                             
98 See Schnabel and Véron (2019) for a tentative sketch of an incentive-compatible EDIS.  
99 In an opinion on the European Commission proposal on the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency 
(eventually adopted in late 2017 as Directive (EU) 2017/2399 as mentioned above), the ECB wrote that it “sees merit in the 
introduction of a general depositor preference, based on a tiered approach, in the [European] Union.” That recommendation, 
however, was not adopted by the EU legislators. The text of the ECB’s opinion is at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L2399&from=EN.  
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4.3 Minimising public cost 
Among the motives for introducing the least-cost test in the United States in 1991 was the imperative 
to restore market discipline, perceived to be weakened in the 1980s by the practice of transferring 
insured and uninsured deposits in P&A transactions. The reform was supposed to ensure that neither 
P&A, nor any other resolution method, would amount to an improper bail-out of uninsured depositors 
and sometimes other creditors using DIF resources. The balance between protecting deposits and 
reassuring creditors on the one hand, and market discipline on the other hand, is tricky to maintain, 
and the application of the least-cost requirement is anything but mechanical. It rests on an elaborate 
set of discretions and constraints that shape FDIC practice, varies according to system-wide conditions, 
and has been subject to increasingly rigorous scrutiny (on both methodology and output) by the US 
Congress. The introduction of the TLGP in October 2008, with its two components of Debt Guarantee 
Program and Transaction Account Guarantee Program, revealed ample flexibility in the framework, and 
the way it could be adapted to crises. Similar flexibility was arguably displayed in the European 
Commission’s successive Banking Communications on state aid control, though not in the relevant 
provisions of BRRD and the SRM Regulation (especially the 8-percent bail-in condition) which may 
appear unnecessarily rigid to veterans of systemic crisis management. (e.g. IMF 2018, Recommendation 
18). TLGP also illustrates the political risk inherent in broad emergency lending authority, since the 
Dodd-Frank Act subsequently narrowed the scope for similar FDIC intervention in the future. 
In the EU context, the objective to minimise the public cost of restructuring failed banks is undermined 
by the multiplicity of sources of relevant public funds, which generates pervasive unhelpful incentives, 
as analysed in Subsection 3.4. The establishment of the SRM and SRF has not substantially reduced this 
problem, and has added the possibility of trade-offs between the use of national versus euro-area (SRF) 
money. The onerous conditions for the use of the SRF may well result in it being underutilised (perhaps 
even never utilised at all), compared to what would be optimal to fulfil the intended objectives of 
safeguarding financial stability while minimising (aggregate, i.e. national and mutualised) public 
expense. The flipside of SRF underutilisation is the excessive use of national public money in bank 
rescues, on motives that typically combine banking nationalism and financial repression intent, even 
when outright capture is absent.  
The compelling response to this challenge would be to eliminate the multiple potential sources of 
public financial support by centralising all such support to handling non-viable banks under the SRB’s 
authority, with a backstop from the ESM as already exists (though in limited and constrained form) for 
the SRF. FDIC experience suggests that the SRB should be able to wield a range of financial tools to be 
effective, including the current SRF and an appropriately calibrated fund for EDIS with the possibility 
for the latter to undertake “alternative measures” as defined in Article 11(6) of DGSD.100 An ESM 
backstop to both the SRF and EDIS (or possibly, in the future, a single fund into which both would 
merge) would not be formally unlimited, since the ESM is itself limited in size, but could be sufficient 
to generate the required trust. Simultaneously, stricter state aid control should effectively deny such 
instruments to individual member states in the banking union. That restriction should become 
acceptable once member states are reassured that the central authorities (i.e. the SRB and ESM) would 
do what it takes to safeguard financial stability.  
                                                             
100 Simultaneously, either the SRB or the ESM should be empowered to provide aid to banks in troubled conditions before the 
point of non-viability, i.e. precautionary recapitalisation (possibly under more stringent conditions of systemic turmoil than in 
the current wording of BRRD) and guarantees and liquidity support to facilitate the funding of solvent banks. Such 
instruments, however, are outside of what this study has defined as the regime for non-viable banks, and thus not elaborated 
here.  
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Centralisation of authority should not imply that all activity would be located in Brussels, the seat of 
the SRB. On the contrary, the SRB should rely on outposts in member states, as is the case in other 
mechanisms such as the SSM or EU competition policy enforcement. The nature and organisation of 
such outposts would be an important matter in the design of reform of the EU regime.  
The centralisation of public resources, regulated by an EU version of the least-cost requirement, would 
naturally eliminate multiple opportunities that may currently exist in member states for local 
malpractice. The central authorities, in turn, can be subjected to greater transparency and 
accountability to ensure unimpeachable use of the public resources granted to them. Here again, the 
FDIC experience suggests this is not an unattainable objective.  
4.4 Franchise marketing 
A key task of dealing with failed banks is to market their franchise in order to sell their business for the 
best possible price, generally to another bank (or to an occasional private-equity investor), managing 
the trade-off between swift execution and price optimisation. This is an area in which the FDIC has 
accumulated considerable experience, from which the EU has much to learn. Contrary to the 
widespread but inaccurate received wisdom, and as explained in Section 2, the process of franchise 
marketing does not happen during the proverbial restructuring weekend, but actually takes weeks if 
not months before the supervisor pulls the FOLTF or equivalent trigger.  
The exigencies of effective franchise marketing are among of the most powerful arguments for 
centralisation of the regime for non-viable banks in the EU, or at least in the banking union area. 
National authorities simply cannot be expected to have either the same capacity and willingness as 
European ones to seek acquirers on a cross-border basis, if at all. Conversely, pan-EEA franchise 
marketing would not eliminate all advantages to consolidation within a given member state, but would 
certainly act as a massive catalyst for cross-border purchases of assets and/or entire businesses. The 
centralisation of the process would also entail economies of scale and facilitate the use of suitable 
technologies for remote due diligence and the proper handling of transaction-relevant information.  
4.5 Dealing with too-big-to-fail 
As is described in Section 2, the United States had no separate regime to deal with the largest banking 
groups until the introduction of Orderly Liquidation Authority in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010—
corporate bankruptcy was the only option for BHCs and large nonbank conglomerates, such as Lehman 
Brothers. Failure to recognise expressly the challenge of institutions that were “too big to fail” did not 
prevent their special treatment. Instead, it led to reinterpretation and repurposing of authorities such 
as open-bank assistance, initially introduced for small banks, but ultimately adapted for behemoths 
such as Continental Illinois in 1984 and Citigroup in 2008, using the statutory systemic risk exception. 
This largely explains the salience of the too-big-to-fail issue in US policy and in the political debates 
about banking sector oversight.  
Conversely, the EU has moved from a system of extensive national guarantees and bail-out practice 
towards an emphasis on open-bank resolution and fostering market discipline through rigid bail-in 
requirements, enshrined in BRRD. While the BRRD legislators’ intent appeared to imply a much wider 
scope for BRRD resolution than OLA in the United States, the revealed preferences in the first few years 
of practice, as analysed above, suggest that NBIPs are the rule and EU resolution the exception, at least 
in the euro area. If so, the respective regimes – OLA in the US, resolution in the EU – may indeed be 
viewed as effectively reserved for the largest banks, more or less what the respective frameworks now 
call Large Banking Organisations in the US and Top-Tier Banks in the EU (Federal Reserve, 2019; 
Directive (EU) 2019/879). Both regimes are essentially untested, the only exception being Banco 
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Popular Español on the EU side but with circumstances that were too idiosyncratic to have general 
precedent value.  
4.6 Regime predictability 
A running theme of this study is that the US regime is far from permanent, and indeed has been shaped 
by a constant process of evolution and learning. Even so, it offers a remarkable degree of predictability 
to investors and market participants, which in turns underpins the degree of market discipline 
exhibited by the US banking system, particularly for smaller banks—which is quite high compared to 
the EU. The key to this is the continuity offered by the FDIC itself over eight and a half decades. While 
the FDIC has made mistakes and should by no means be idealised, it has endured as the central pillar 
of the US regime for non-viable banks, and a credible backstop for the dizzying array of financial 
regulators in the US system. EU policymakers should aspire to develop the SRB into a EU equivalent, 
and then to improve on the model.  
Centralisation in the context of bank failure management would foster predictability. 28 (EU) or 31 
(EEA) different NBIPs with their idiosyncratic concepts and separate case law cannot offer the same 
wealth of comparable cases and precedents as a single regime can. They imply that the “no-creditor-
worse-off” comparison in resolution is country-specific, and thus introduces competitive distortions 
across member states – namely, the “single resolution mechanism” is anything but single. This is 
compounded by the fact that, as emphasised in the previous section, in the EU context national law 
(including NBIP) is easier to change, including in rapid response to a crisis situation, than EU law, or 
than US federal law for that matter.  
Beyond its designation as a central agency, the SRB should suitably be empowered and made 
accountable to the EU public through relevant institutional mechanisms. It should be relieved of the 
unnecessary current tutelage by the European Commission and Council on individual resolution 
decisions, which is justified neither by legal nor operational considerations.101 A centralised framework, 
with a hub-and-spokes architecture (in which the frontline teams are in the member states as now, but 
ultimate decision-making is integrated within the SRB) would enable the SRB to foster specialist skills 
and experiences much more effectively than in the current scattered architecture. It would reduce the 
risk of dysfunction in resolution resulting from the diverging mandates and interests of national 
resolution authorities, sometimes separate DGSs, and the SRB. It would benefit from much more cross-
border knowledge transfer. Overall, one can expect considerably enhanced operational credibility of 
the EU regime (and of the SRB as its central agent) as a result, and greater effectiveness and efficiency 
in the handling of future cases of non-viable banks.  
Another dimension in which the SRB can learn a lot from the FDIC is the public provision of research, 
insight and data on its activity and on the scope of its mandate. The FDIC’s own books on its successive 
experiences (FDIC 1984, 1997, 1998, 2017) are exemplary in this respect. So is much of its research on 
individual cases and themes.  
4.7 Breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle 
There is a fundamental alignment between the above arguments to centralise the EU regime for non-
viable banks, in order to make it more effective, and the objective of the banking union project itself, 
                                                             
101 See e.g. Lintner (2017) and Véron (2019) on the respective legal and operational aspects. The European Commission and/or 
Council may however retain involvement in the decision-making process when SRF resources are to be used, as is the case of 
the US Treasury and Federal Reserve for activation of the OLF.  
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namely the “imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” Given the parallel 
imperative to defend financial stability, this cannot be achieved with state aid control alone – the 
possibility of public financial intervention may be restricted but should not be eliminated. Thus, 
centralisation of the regime for non-viable banks, including its financial components such as deposit 
insurance (i.e. EDIS) and the already existing SRF, is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for 
breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle. (Other conditions include, prominently, capital regulations 
to disincentivise concentrated sovereign exposures, centrally provided funding liquidity and 
guarantees for viable banks in troubled times as mentioned above in Subsection 4.3, and the eventual 
elimination of intra-euro-area ring-fencing of capital and liquidity.)  
The US has not had to deal with this problem at the national level. Its banking sector initially developed 
in the absence of a comprehensive financial safety net. Even in the 19th century, the bank-sovereign 
nexus at the state level was generally ad hoc and less solid than in most EU member states now 
(Gelpern and Véron 2018). The US fiscal framework came to be dominated by federal taxes and transfers 
level since the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, a trend that only intensified in the early 20th 
century and with the New Deal in the 1930s (Kirkegaard 2018). When a robust safety net, centered on 
deposit protection, was introduced following the crisis of the early 1930s, it was built at the federal 
level after the field had been cleared of competition from state schemes. As a result, that nexus did not 
become a vicious circle at the US state level, in contrast to the euro area. As for the national (federal) 
level, the creditworthiness of the US government was never materially questioned even at the peak of 
financial crisis in late 2008.  
If and when the public safety net on banks is pooled at the European level, the role of state aid control 
will not disappear (if only because the banking union area is not expected to extend to the entire single 
market any time soon), but it will be significantly reduced. The above-outlined policy package does not 
necessarily imply the complete decorrelation of bank credit conditions from idiosyncratic national 
features, which can be expected to linger for the foreseeable features given differences within the euro 
area in the frameworks for taxation, corporate and personal insolvency, housing finance, pension 
finance, and countless other areas. But what can and should be achieved in the near term is the 
decorrelation of bank credit from sovereign credit. This is a realistic aim for EU reformers.  
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 CONCLUSIONS 
Reform of the EU regime for non-viable banks is in the air, often combined with broader discussion 
about the unfinished banking union. The SRB has advocated EU harmonisation of NBIPs for more than 
a year.102 Recent contributions that advocate further reform, with various degrees of ambition and/or 
specificity, include IMF (2018); Deslandes, Dias and Magnus (2019); Lastra, Russo and Bodellini (2019); 
Restoy (2019); and last but not least, von der Leyen (2019)103.  
This study does not allow for the formulation of a comprehensive blueprint for reform of the EU regime 
for non-viable banks, let alone for the completion of the banking union. We also do not suggest a 
specific sequencing of the suggested reforms, but we believe that all the key legislative decisions could 
– and should – be made within the next five-year term of the incoming European Commission. The 
examination of the US regime supports the proposition that completing the banking union and making 
the EU regime for non-viable banks effective may be viewed as two facets of the same policy effort. The 
shortcomings of the EU status quo are most compellingly addressed through centralisation and 
empowerment of the SRB as the decision-making hub for a unitary regime that encompasses what is 
currently covered in EU law by resolution, bank insolvency proceedings, and deposit insurance.  
A deep understanding of the US antecedent can unquestionably accelerate the EU learning and reform 
process. One of our findings is that the United States has reached a reasonably appealing balance 
between the broad objective of protecting deposits and the need to limit moral hazard, at least for all 
but the largest banks. Having the European deposit insurance fund participate in the funding of P&A-
type transactions, i.e. allowing a future EDIS to finance “alternative measures” as in Article 11(6) of 
DGSD, would appear apt in light of our analysis; so would adopting general depositor preference, 
implying changes to the current Article 108 of BRRD.  
For the largest banks, where the regime is untested on both sides of the Atlantic, the EU could choose 
to keep its current preference for a resolution approach that signals a predetermined amount of bail-
in (the BRRD’s 8-percent bail-in condition) as opposed to the more flexible US approach under OLA. It 
should complement its approach with credible arrangements for liquidity in resolution. Conversely, for 
small and medium-sized banks, we see no compelling reason for an EU unitary regime not to adopt the 
defining features of the largely successful FDIC toolkit, with the economies of scale and operational 
efficiency that that entails.  
If our suggestions sound radical, it may be worth emphasising the core finding of our analysis of the EU 
regime. The EU resolution framework set by BRRD is being circumvented – one could go as far as 
arguing it was designed for circumvention. This state of affairs implies both that the intent of the BRRD 
legislators is not being achieved, and that the objective of breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle 
cannot be met within the current framework. We do not believe that the future build-up of additional 
MREL buffers will fundamentally alter the incentives that we describe in Section 3. To change that 
situation, a comprehensive overhaul of the entire EU regime for non-viable banks will be needed.  
  
                                                             
102 See e.g. Elke König, “Real defragmentation of the Banking Union: the way forward”, article for Eurofi, 26 April 2018, available 
at https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/544.  
103 In her policy manifesto published on the day of her election on 16 July 2019, the President-elect of the European 
Commission pledged to “focus on completing the Banking Union”, adding “we need a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. 
[…] I will also put forward measures for a robust bank resolution and insolvency framework”.  
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For 85 years, the US regime for non-viable banks has maintained a high degree 
of stability and public confidence by protecting deposits, while working to 
minimise the public cost of that protection. With awareness of the difference in 
context, EU reformers can draw valuable insights from the US experience. On 
balance, a review of the US regime supports arguments in favour of 
harmonisation and centralisation of bank insolvency proceedings and deposit 
insurance in Europe’s banking union. A unitary regime would improve on the 
current EU status quo along multiple dimensions: deposit protection, creditor 
rights, controlling moral hazard, predictability and operational effectiveness, 
transparency and accountability, and financial stability. It would help break the 
bank-sovereign vicious circle in the euro area. The US experience suggests that 
substantial improvements are achievable in a well-designed system of 
institutional checks and balances that learns and adapts over time.  
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